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Reported Opinions
Russell PURDY and Lee W. Woods, t/ a
Foreign Car Center
V.
Anthony OLIVE and Theresa B. Shelby
D.C. Gen. Sess., Civil No. GS 16395-64.
April 24, 1967. Opinion Per Edgerton,J.
Motion pursuant to Gen. Sess. Civ. R.
60 (b) (6) to vacate default judgments
against defendant on the ground that
defendant never received service of pro-
cess on the date testified to by special
process server appointed pursuant to
Gen. Sess. Civ. R. 4 (g). Held, no pre-
sumption of validity attaches to return
of service of special process server; such
service is not entitled to the same weight






D.C. Gen. Sess., Crim. Nos. D.C. 854-67,
D.C. 855-67. April 26, 1967. Opinion Per
Murphy, J.
Defendant was charged with disorderly
conduct for activities engaged in after
having been apprehended and arrested
for public intoxication. On the basis
of testimony by a social worker and
other facts, defendant was declared a
chronic alcoholic, disposing of the pub-
lic intoxication charge. Defendant fur-
ther claimed that since he was a chronic
alcoholic, he could not be found guilty
of the disorderly conduct charge be-
cause the conduct was a product of the
alcoholism. Held, for chronic alcohol-
ism to be a defense to such a charge,
burden is on defendant to prove that
he was so drunk that he did not know
what he was doing and that the acts
constituting the disorderly conduct were
involuntary.




D.C. Gen. Sess., Crim. No. D.C. 34194-66.
May 4, 1967.*
Defendant was charged with vagrancy
under Sections 3 and 8 of the vagrancy
statute, 22 D.C. Code § 3302. Held,
although defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of violating Section 3,
Section 8 is unconstitutional for rea-
son that it attempts to use the accused's
silence or his invocation of the fifth
amendment to supply the element of
failure to give good account, as required
to complete the offense. The court found
further that the warning requirements
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), were inapplicable to police ques-
tioning of defendant on the street,
since his freedom was not significantly
impaired.
Order in accordance with opinion.
MURPHY, Judge
The defendant was charged with vio-
lation of Sections 3 and 8 of the Va-
grancy statute' and was tried by the
Court on January 10, 1967; the case was
taken under advisement. Counsel sub-
sequently submitted legal memoranda
and made oral arguments on behalf of
their respective causes which were of
great assistance to the Court. Having
considered all the testimony and mate-
rial submitted to the Court by both sides,
the Court concludes the defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of




At the time of his arrest on Novem-
ber 13, 1966, Wardell Hicks had been
arrested and charged in approximately
100 cases and had been convicted or
*Editor's Note: Some of the court's footnotes have
been omitted, others have been renumbered.
1. D. C. Code, Title 22, Section 3302.
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forfeited collateral in over 50 cases.
Indeed, at trial the defense stipulated
to the record and advised the Court the
defendant had been arrested a number
of times between the date of the offense
and the trial date. Although a convicted
thief, defendant's criminal specialty is
bootlegging and in recent years his
arrests have in most part related to this
activity in one form or another.
The testimony before the Court con-
sisted solely of the Government's case
-the defense standing on its various
motions.
The first Government witness, Officer
Wallace J. Thorne, testified that on
October 12, 1966, he was working as
Vice Officer in the vicinity of 8th Street,
Northwest. About 2:30 A.M., he observ-
ed the defendant, known to him as a
bootlegger, loitering and talking to a
convicted bootlegger. Officer Thorne
approached the defendant and filled out
a vagrancy form,2 asking the defendant
where he lived, worked, his age, and what
he was doing at that particular time. The
defendant gave his age and address, and
stated he was a self-employed cement
finisher and that he had just come out of
his home which was nearby.
Officer Thorne further testified that
on November 2, 1966, at about 3:45
A.M., he again saw the defendant with
a known bootlegger. The defendant was
observed to approach a car, engage a
male driver in conversation, then walk
away. The officer approached the defend-
ant to fill out another vagrancy form.
In response to the vagrancy questions,
supra, the defendant stated he had just
left a restaurant and worked at Gaylor
Construction Company as a cement fin-
isher.
On cross-examination the officer testi-
fied he had known the defendant a
number of years, had arrested him be-
fore and knew he bootlegged at 8th and
T Streets during the hours liquor stores
were closed. He believed Hicks was a
2. A vagrancy form is a prepared series of ques-
tions used in making vagrancy observations. The
suspect's answers to the questions are written on
the form by the questioning officer. These forms
later become used as the bases for arrest and evi-
dence at trial.
bootlegger because "he loiters about at
late and unusual hours of the night,
morning, selling whisky; as every time
I've talked to him, he has a different
means of employment, which, when I
see him during the day, during the
night, leads me to believe he is not
employed, although I can't prove this
out and this leads me to believe he is a
vagrant." Officer Thorne further testi-
fied the defendant bootlegged almost
every day and he had observed him, and
could make a vagrancy observation on
him almost any day but he had other
things to do.
Officer Thorne stated that he gave no
warning of rights to Hicks at the time
of either observation, but that he had
warned him on the occasion of other
arrests.
The second witness called by the Gov-
ernment was Private Thomas White-
head, a Vice Investigator, who, on Octo-
ber 14, 1966, at approximately 2:10 A.M.,
observed the defendant at 8th and T
Streets, Northwest. At that time the
defendant approached 2 cars, handed
the occupants a bottle and received
something in return. The officer began
to make a vagrancy observation of the
defendant. When questioned about the
items on the vagrancy form, defendant
refused to answer "under the Fifth
Amendment." The officer stated that he
made no arrest at that time, but he
had arrested the defendant on a prior
occasion at his home located some 50 or
75 feet from the corner of 8th and T.
The officer stated he does not arrest
suspected vagrants who refuse to make
statements.
The final witness was Detective Eu-
gene Fitzsimmons, a Vice Investigator
of 4 years' experience, who testified he
arrested the defendant on November
13, 1966 at about 2:30 A.M., at 8th and
T Streets, Northwest. He observed the
defendant walk over to a car and say,
"O.K., give me six dollars." The car's
occupant gave Hicks some money. The
occupant subsequently stated he was,
when observed by the police officer, in
the process of purchasing from defend-
ant 2 half pints for six dollars. When
[Vol. XVII
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Hicks was asked if this were [sic], he re-
mained silent and was placed under ar-
rest. On his person at the time of arrest
were 12 half pints of whisky.
On cross-examination Detective Fitz-
simmons stated he never arrested a sus-
pected vagrant who refused to answer
questions. He had arrested the defend-
ant at least on 5 prior occasions for
vagrancy and he had made over 20 va-
grancy observations on him in the past,
and knew at the time of this arrest
there were 5 vagrancy forms in the cur-
rent file. He arrested him because he
did not give a good account of himself.
He stated on some previous occasions




Counsel for Hicks has presented this
Court with a number of substantive
grounds for declaring Sections 3 and
8 of the Vagrancy statutes unconstitu-
tional, which arguments can be sum-
marized as follows:
1. The statute, on its face and as
applied, violates the self-incrimination
provision of the Fifth Amendment; col-
laterally, the statute in practice violates
the constitutional requirements of Mir-
anda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. The statute is so vague in defining
what constitutes a criminal offense that
it violates the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
3. The statute authorizes preventive
convictions on suspicion in violation
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
4. The statute restricts freedom of
movement in violation of the due pro-
3. D. C. Code, § 22-3302.
The following classes of persons shall be
deemed vagrants in the District of Columbia:
(3) Any person leading an immoral or proflig-
ate life who has no lawful employment and
who has no lawful means of support realized
from a lawful occupation or source.
(8) Any person who wanders about the streets
at late or unusual hours of the night without
any visible or lawful business and not giving
a good account of himself.
cess clause of the Fifth Amendment.
5. The statute punishes persons for
status, not unlawful conduct, in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment.
Since the submission of these sub-
stantive arguments, Ricks v. United
States, -D.C. Ct. App.- (1967) was de-
cided by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Whatever scope of
inquiry and conclusions relative to the
above arguments were drawn by this
Court after taking this case under ad-
visement, Ricks is now controlling and
eliminates by direct holding or direct
inference consideration of the latter
four arguments. Argument 2, vagueness,
is disposed of directly in Ricks, Section
VI, with respect to Section 8 of the sta-
tute. Further, the only dubious terms
of Section 3 of the statute, "immoral
and profligate life," are likewise dealt
with in Section VI of Ricks. Argu-
ment 3, preventative convictions on sus-
picion, is dealt with directly in Ricks,
Section V, and indirectly in Section I.
Argument 4, freedom of movement, is
controlled by Ricks, Section II. Argu-
ment 5, status, is disposed of by Sections
III and IV of Ricks. These Ricks sec-
tions relative to defendant's Arguments
3, 4, and 5, are as applicable to Section
3 of the Vagrancy statute as they are to
Section 8.
The remaining questions, not fully
controlled by Ricks, are the most im-
portant and substantial ones both in
terms of defendant's brief and in terms
of their legal and practical implications:
do Sections 3 and 8 violate defendant's
constitutional rights as guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment and by Miranda?
The Vagrancy statute begins, "The
following classes of persons shall be
deemed vagrants in the District of Col-
umbia." D. C. Code, Title 22, Section
3302. Each section defines specific activi.
ty by a specific individual which consti-
tutes the offense. An individual can
obviously fall within one of the sections
without violating the others. Therefore
the constitutionality and applicability
of Sections 3 and 8 are separate pro-
blems deserving separate consideration.
1968]
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III
Section 3
The Court approaches its considera-
tion of these problems with all due
caution towards treading into a consti-
tutional area and with full deference
to the holdings of superior courts. The
Court is, therefore, reluctant to declare
any legislative act unconstitutional un-
less it appears clearly so, and is flatly
unwilling to challenge the constitutional
determinations of higher courts.4 With
this in mind, we turn to Section 3 of the
Vagrancy statute. Section 3 has essen-
tially two parts: leading an immoral and
profligate life; and no lawful employ-
ment or means of support. The burden
of proof is as follows: First, the Govern-
ment must show that defendant has
been leading an immoral and profli-
gate life. Then it is up to defendant
to show lawful employment or means
of support. This procedure has been
both legislatively and decisionally es-
tablished.5 The constitutionality of this
procedure has been directly ruled upon
by the D. C. Court of Appeals in Rogers
v. District of Columbia, 31 A.2d 649
(Mun. App. D.C. 1943), and convictions
under this section have been upheld
numerous times since then.6 In light
of this precedent, the Court is con-
strained to narrow its inquiry to appli-
cation of the law of Section 3 to the
facts of this case.
On the facts, the Government ade-
quately established that defendant Hicks
was leading an immoral and profligate
4. This Court accepts the similar point of view
expressed in the opinion of the trial court in Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Hattie Mae Ricks, Criminal
Action # 3050-66, page 13; see also United States
v. Lewis, 100 A.2d 40 (Mun. App. D.C. 1953); La-
Croix v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 820 (D.C. WD
Tenn. 1935).
5. D. C. Code, Title 22, Section 3303, Prosecu-
tions-Burden of proof to show employment; Clark
v. District of Columbia, 34 A.2d 711 (D.C. Mun.
App. 1944); Baker and Fredricksen v. District of
Columbia, 184 A.2d 198 (D.C. Mun. App. 1962).
6. Clark, id; Baker and Fredricksen, id; Coley
v. District of Columbia, 177 A.2d 889 (D.C. Mun.
App. 1962); Burns v. District of Columbia, 34 A.2d
714 (D.C. Mun. App. 1944); Williams v. District
of Columbia, 65 A.2d 924 (D.C. Mun. App. 1949);
Davenport v. District of Columbia, 61 A.2d 486
(D.C. Mun. App. 1948); Barnard v. District of
Columbia, 125 A.2d 514 (D.C. Mun. App. 1956).
life, both for purposes of probable
cause for arrest and proof at trial.
The second question is, did Hicks
establish lawful employment or source
of income? The Court thinks he did not.
The burden is on Hicks, footnote 5,
supra. To meet it, at trial the defense
offered no affirmative evidence. The only
testimony in this regard was from Gov-
ernment witnesses, to whom Hicks stated
on one occasion he was self-employed and
on another he worked for a certain
company. The other two times he said
nothing along this line. Given the dis-
crepancies between these two accounts
of employment, the facility of proving
actual employment, and the frequency
with which Hicks was seen on the street
corner obviously not pursuing his de-
clared employment, this Court finds that
Hicks did not satisfactorily establish law-
ful employment or source of income.
Therefore, the Court finds the defend-
ant guilty of violation of D. C. Code,
Title 22-3302, Section 3.
IV
Section 8
Section 8 poses a somewhat different
problem.
First, there is no additional support-
ing statutory provision for this section,
and there is relatively little decisional
law. Most importantly, this Court's re-
search divulged no case controlling on
the Fifth Amendment challenge to Sec-
tion 8-failure to give a "good account."
At this point it might be helpful to
pause and inquire, just what is the
nature, the function, of "good account"?
Is failure to give it an element of the
offense, requisite before an arrest and
conviction can be obtained, or is giving
it an exculpatory device by which the
potential vagrant can avoid arrest and/or
conviction? Although the concept of
"good account" has been dealt with
before, it retains an essential ambiguity
which is reflected even in the recent
Ricks case itself. In Section V of Ricks,
[Vol. XVII
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countering the argument that the Va-
grancy statute allows arrest on mere
suspicion, the Court uses failure to give
a "good account" as one of the factors
which combine to create more than
mere suspicion, factors which constitute
the offense itself. But in the subsequent
section of Ricks dealing with vagueness,
failure to give a good account is seen as
a restriction on the application of the
statute, a way out of probable cause
already established. In the opinion of
this Court, the District of Columbia can-
not have it both ways. Either it is a
substantive element or a procedural out-
let. Given the latitude offered by the
ambiguous treatment of this term in
prior cases, this Court concludes that
failure to give a "good account" is a
substantive element of the offense. This
conclusion is supported by the realiza-
tion that, were this not so, all persons
who wander about at late hours without
visible business are subject to arrest as
vagrants. Probable cause would be es-
tablished. It is not our opinion that prob-
able cause and subsequent conviction
can be based upon so slender a reed.
Logic compels that failure to give a
"good account" be considered a part
of the offense itself.
This so, the constitutional problem
becomes obvious. Can the defendant be
compelled under Section 8 to supply
one of the elements of the offense? Can
his failure to give an account supply
this element in light of the Fifth Amend-
ment?
First, this Court would like to refer
to the number and trend of recent deci-
sions by the U. S. Supreme Court ex-
panding the scope of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege *** [citations omitted.]
The thrust of all these cases is the basic
proposition that an accused need not
say anything, and that nothing can be
concluded from his silence.
Next, this Court would like to call
attention to Benton v. United States,
98 U.S. App. D.C. 84, 232 F.2d 341
(1956). Benton involved a conviction un-
der D. C. Code 22-3601.T Defendant was
convicted of carrying a crowbar and not
giving a satisfactory account of himself.
The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed,
holding in essence that a crowbar is
just not "sinister" enough to require a
person to account for it.The Court held
that application of the statute at least to
this situation was unconstitutional.
* * *
The Court left open, however, the area
wherein a tool of crime was sinister,
self-incriminating, in itself. ***
The parallels between Benton and
Vagrancy are clear. In fact, Beail,8 a
Vagrancy case, was one of the few au-
thorities cited in the Benton opinion.
Both statutes, Possession of Instruments
and Vagrancy, involve proscribed activity
and a "good account". In 3601, it is
possession of an instrument; in 3302, it
is suspicious activity. Benton says that
some instruments are "sinister", and
some are not. Likewise in Vagrancy,
some activity is sinister, and some is not.
Where the activity is by a known crim-
inal (Section 1) or by one who leads an
immoral or profligate life (Section 3)
this can properly be viewed as suffi-
ciently sinister to require defendant to
give an account of himself, or to show
his employment. Benton does not con-
tradict. But where the conduct is itself
more ambiguous, carrying a crowbar,
or wandering about the streets late at
night without visible business (Section
8), these are just not sinister enough to
require defendant to come forward.
It is now appropriate to re-examine
Section 8 of the Vagrancy statute in
light of the above cases. The elements
of this offense are:
1. wandering about
2. at late or unusual hours of the night
3. without any visible or lawful busi-
ness
4. and not giving a good account.
7. D. C. Code, § 22-3601:
No person shall have in his possession in the
District any instrument, tool, or other imple-
ment for picking locks or pockets, or that is
usually employed, or reasonably may be em-
ployed in the commission of any crime, if he
is unable satisfactorily to account for the pos-
session of the implement.
8. Beail v. District of Columbia, 82 A.2d 765
(Mun. Ct. App. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 91
U.S. App. D.C. 140, 210 F.2d 176.
1968]
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Failure to give a good account might
result from three situations, all of which
are involved in this case: invoking of
the Fifth Amendment; merely remain-
ing silent; offering some account which
is not satisfactory. It is this Court's con-
clusion that, in the wake of the Supreme
Court opinions, it is not constitutional
to use an accused's silence or his affirma-
tive invocation of the Fifth Amend-
ment against him to supply an element
of this type of offense. The offense is
not complete without his silence, it is
not an offense at all, it is not even
inherently sinister or suspicious. And
this leads to the broader conclusion,
under Benton, that no account can be
required of the defendant in a Section 8
situation. The type of activity described
by the first three elements of this por-
tion of the Vagrancy statute is not in-
herently sinister and cannot reasonably
or constitutionally compel such an ac-
count.
Defendant Hicks on different occa-
sions used in this prosecution invoked
the Fifth Amendment, remained silent,
and gave weak explanations of his activ-
ity. The distinction among his reactions
is moot. The defendant can not be
asked to make a crime out of what is
not a crime. Because Section 8 attempts
just this, this Court finds this part of
the Vagrancy statute unconstitutional.
V
Miranda
The question is also raised concern-
ing the conduct of the vagrancy observa-
tions of defendant Hicks without warn-
ing him of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona.
This Court finds no violation of Mir-
anda in the present case. The procedural
safeguards effective to secure defendant's
privileges, the "Miranda warnings", do
not come into play until defendant is in
custody, until his freedom is significant-
ly impaired. On the record, there is
nothing to suggest that Hicks' freedom
was impaired; on the contrary, he ap-
peared to be free to walk away and on
at least one occasion he so did. Miranda
does not eliminate all pre-custodial
police questioning.9 The Court concludes
that defendant Hicks was not in custody
and therefore his responses to police
questions were not inadmissible under
Miranda.
VI
The Court would like to comment
further on two areas of enforcement of
the Vagrancy law. Were procedures
similar to the following adopted, the
more objectionable aspects of Vagrancy
enforcement could be greatly reduced:
First, when a police officer makes a
vagrancy observation he generally does
not consider the defendant under ar-
rest. As stated previously, this Court
does not believe that such pre-custodial
interrogation as a matter of law violates
Miranda v. Arizona. Whether the defend-
ant actually is under arrest is a subjec-
tive and objective matter which must
be determined by the facts of each
case.10 If enforcement practices dictate
that three observations should be made
prior to arrest, then it would appear
prudent for the questioning officer to
make two things clear whenever he
starts to write up a vagrancy observa-
tion: (1) he is a policeman and making
a vagrancy observation; (2) the addressed
person is not under arrest. This would
ensure that both parties knew what
was going on and help clarify the ques-
tion of whether and when an arrest took
place."
9. "As we have noted, our decision does not in
any way preclude police from carrying out their
tradition of investigatory functions." 384 U.S. at
481.
10. United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837
(DCDC 1957); Kelley v. United States, 111 U.S.
App. D.C. 396, 298 F.2d 310 (1961); United States
v. Mitchell, 179 F. Supp. 636 (DCDC 1959); District
of Columbia v. Perry, 215 A.2d 845 (DCDC 1965);
White v. United States, op. cit. supra; Brown v.
United States, op. cit. supra.
11. One might speculate why a suspected vagrant
would answer the observations questions, especially
since most have been prosecuted under the Vagrancy
statutes before on the basis of such observations.
Experienced police officers believe this comes about
because the vagrant is usually a bootlegger, con-
fidence man, addict, or prostitute. In such occupa-
tion, they seek to buy as much time on the street
as possible; cooperation frequently accomplishes
this. They are frequently police informants who
[Vol. XVII
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Secondly, the Court believes it to be
a better practice were Vagrancy arrests
made on the basis of warrants. Defense
counsel vigorously urged that the pres-
ent enforcement practices leave the
public at the mercy of the arresting of-
ficer who frequently cannot define the
terms of the statute. However real this
danger is, its very threat is absolutely
unnecessary.
Except in most unusual cases, all Va-
grancy arrests should be by warrant.
The desirability of arrest by warrant has
been strongly suggested by the U.S. Su-
preme Court.12 In Ford v. United States,
122 U.S. App. D.C. 259, 352 F.2d 927
(1965) (en banc), the highest court of
this jurisdiction discussed the question
of whether under the court's supervisory
jurisdiction a rule should be adopted
requiring that felony arrest without war-
rant not be deemed valid where obtain-
ing of a warrant is practicable. While
stating the practice of arresting without
a warrant when it is practicable to ob-
tain one is not to be encouraged, the
court declined to invoke its supervisory
power at that time. It did issue a stern
warning, however:
That authority [federal supervisory
power], of course, continues to re-
main available if we ever become
persuaded that a practice of not get-
ting warrants, even though practi-
cable to do so, was resulting in a
significant number of unreasonable
arrests, inflicting an injustice upon
the immediate victims as well as a
strain upon the judicial machinery.' 3
Although this case involved felony ar-
rest as probable cause, it clearly re-
flects the Court's view that warrantless
arrests should not take place without
some demonstrated need. Although Va-
grancy is a misdemeanor committed in
the officer's presence, the lack of urgency
and the need for supervision in this
know the police will ultimately enforce the law but
also realize cooperation helps to keep them on the
street.
12. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
13. 122 U.S. App. D.C. at 265.
area of law enforcement compels the
use of warrants as much as possible.' 4 In
view of the policy which requires three
observations in Vagrancy cases, there ap-
pears no good reason why there need be
a warrantless arrest. The fact that a
vagrant continues his way of life over
the period of the observations makes it
unlikely he will flee or present an im-
mediate high danger to the community.
Vagrancy prosecution could be made
within such limits with no substantial
harm to law enforcement.
In practice, the officer involved should
submit to the prosecutor detailed affi-
davits setting forth the reasons why in
his belief there is probable cause for
arrest. The prosecution can thus ensure
that the police officer is seeking to en-
force the statute in a proper manner.
The prosecutor can then submit these
affidavits in support of a request for an
arrest warrant to a judicial officer, pro-
viding a second, judicial supervision
over the work of the police and the views
of the prosecutor.15
If the above suggestions were adopted,
no vagrancy suspects would be question-
ed without clear awareness of what was
transpiring, and no vagrant would be
arrested without prosecutory and judi-
cial supervision.
14. The Court does not mean to imply that
vagrancy arrests presently made in the District are
unreasonable, inflicting an injustice upon the im-
mediate victims as well as a strain upon the judicial
machinery, but the potential for abuse is high and
should be curbed.
15. The Corporation Counsel's Office presently,
when seeking warrants in most offenses they en-
force [sic], usually submits an information with a
warrant form on the back containing at best highly
conclusive language with little or no supporting
affidavit. Such warrants do not appear to meet the
standards required by United States v. Ventresca,
op. cit. supra; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108




D.C. Gen. Sess., Crim. No. DC 2021-67.
May 11, 1967.*
Editor's Note: Some of the court's footnotes
have been omitted, others have been renumbered.
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Defendant became loud and boisterous
in a face to face confrontation with
police officer, and was charged with dis-
orderly conduct. Held, in order to find
that defendant did "congregate and as-
semble" within the meaning of 22 D.C.
Code § 1107 (1) (disorderly conduct stat-
ute), it must be shown that three or
more persons had acted in concert for
an unlawful purpose.
Defendant accordingly found not guil-
ty.
MURPHY, Judge
On January 19, 1967, Private Anthony
Morris of the Metropolitan Police De-
partment arrested Donald Reed for
double-parking and disorderly conduct.
The case was tried by the Court on
January 29, 1967. The defendant was
charged in the disorderly case as follows:
Donald H. Reed, late of the District
of Columbia aforesaid, on or about
the 15th day of January, in the year
A. D., nineteen hundred and sixty-
seven, in the District of Columbia
aforesaid, and in front of 1930 Four-
teenth Street, Northwest, did then
and there engage in disorderly con-
duct, to wit: did engage in loud and
boisterous language, and other dis-
orderly conduct, contrary to and in
violation of an Act of Congress Po-
lice Regulation in such case made
and provided, and constituting a
law of the District of Columbia.
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to
limit the proof to loud and boisterous
talking. After an initial objection, the
prosecutor agreed to limit his proof on
the disorderly conduct charge to this
conduct.
The arresting officer testified he was
on patrol in uniform in a marked scout
car when he observed the defendant
double-parked in the 1900 block of 14th
Street, Northwest. There were two park-
ing spaces available to the defendant.
He drove up behind the parked car
and waited 45 seconds to a minute.
When the defendant did not move, he
flicked his spotlights into defendant's
mirror, waited a while longer, then
briefly sounded the siren. The defendant
still failed to move or park his car. The
police officer moved his car near the
rear of defendant's car, got out and ap-
proached the defendant and asked for
license and registration. The defendant
got out of his car and "in a loud and
boisterous voice and highly agitated man-
ner," demanded, "What are you doing
throwing the spotlight in my face?"
When the officer again sought the li-
cense and registration, the defendant
stated, in a loud and boisterous voice
again, "Don't point your finger at me."
Upon a third demand, the defendant
replied, "I don't give a damn what you
do, officer." At this point the officer
called for a wagon. While waiting for
the wagon, the defendant's wife inter-
jected herself into the proceeding, ad-
vising the defendant to drive off and
accused the police of harassment. When
the wagon arrived the defendant held
onto the car and was removed forceably
and placed in the wagon.
Upon cross-examination and re-direct,
the officer stated he had never asked
the defendant why he was double-parked
or to move his car. He stated some
people had gathered on the sidewalk
during his initial confrontation with
the defendant but no one had com-
plained about the noise, stated they were
annoyed or that they thought defendant
was loud and boisterous. At the time of
the officer's stopping behind the defend-
ant, the traffic was between medium
and heavy, and defendant's car definite-
ly obstructed the orderly flow of traffic.
The defendant testified in his own
behalf and raised issues of credibility
concerning the facts of the disorderly con-
duct and admitted the double-parking.
The Court found the defendant guilty of
the double-parking and took the dis-
orderly conduct case under advisement.
After hearing arguments, and studying
the memos submitted by counsel, the
Court, on April 14, 1967, resolved the
credibility issues against the accused,
but found the defendant not guilty un-
der the facts and law of this case on the
disorderly charge. This opinion is in




The heart of the issue before this
Court was whether a defendant who
alone becomes loud and boisterous in
a face-to-face confrontation with a po-
lice officer can be found guilty of dis-
orderly conduct under the first section
of 22 D. C. Code 1107. The Court thinks
not. The pertinent section of the dis-
orderly statute reads as follows:
It shall not be lawful for any
person or persons within the Dis-
trict of Columbia to congregate and
assemble in any street, avenue, alley,
road, or highway, or in or around
any public building or inclosure,
or any park or reservation, or at the
entrance of any private building or
inclosure, and engage in loud and
boisterous talking or other disorder-
ly conduct.
The offense then has two elements:
A. That the defendant did con-
gregate and assemble;
B. That he did engage in loud and
boisterous talking or other disorderly
conduct.
Looking at the second element first, the
Court finds the defendant was loud and
boisterous' under the circumstances of
this case. However, the Government
failed to prove the first element; that
is, the defendant did congregate and
assemble.
A. Congregating: On June 7, 1966,
the Office of the Corporation Counsel
issued an opinion to the Police Depart-
ment concerning 22 D. C. Code 1121 (2),
the so-called "failure to move on" stat-
ute. This statute provides:
Whoever, with intent to pro-
voke a breach of the peace, or under
circumstances such that a breach of
the peace may be occasioned there-
by *** congregates with others on
1. The "other disorderly conduct" found in this
element relates to other like disorderly conduct,
such as screaming, loud singing, clapping, and
similar noisy outbursts of sound. Jalbert v. District
of Columbia, 221 A.2d 96 (D. C. App. 1966).
a public street and refuses to move
on when ordered by the police.
In his excellent lengthy opinion, the
(Acting) Corporation Counsel stated:
Additionally, to support a finding
of guilt under Code Section 22-1121
(2) it must be established that one
'congregates with others on a pub-
lic street.' It has been held by some
courts that to establish this element
of the offense at least three persons
must be present. People v. LoVech-
hio, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 354, 358 (1945);
People v. Carcel, 165 N.Y.S. 2d 113,
144 N.E. 2d 81, 65 ALR 2d 1145
(1957).
It appears the position urged upon the
Court in this case by the Office of the
Corporation Counsel is inconsistent with
its position of June 10, 1966. This Court
agrees with the New York Court that
a congregation requires at least three
persons; there being only two persons
in this case, there was no congregation.
B. Assembling: At common law, if
three or more persons assembled for a
purpose which, if executed, would con-
stitute a rout or riot, but separated with-
out carrying out their purpose, it con-
stituted unlawful assembly. Hunter v.
District of Columbia, 47 App. D.C. 406
(1918). Since there were only two per-
sons at the most assembled under the
circumstances, there can be no unlawful
assembly.2 The Hunter case is squarely
on point in this case. The statute in
question is identical in language, where
pertinent, to 1107, although the facts
in that case involved an alleged incom-
moding of the sidewalk. The defendant
was charged in that case as follows:
"did congregate and assemble on
Pennsylvania avenue, N. W., did
then and there crowd, obstruct,
and incommode the free use of the
2. The Court does not need to decide the issue
of whether the presence of a number of policemen
with the defendant can constitute an assembly, but
it would appear not since the above definition re-
quires the persons so assembled to be in concert.
Cf., People v. Lo~echhio, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 354, 358
(1945).
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sidewalk thereof on said avenue.
Contrary to and in violation of an
act of Congress in such case made
and provided, and constituting a
law of the District of Columbia."
The Court in reversing this conviction
noted:
It follows, therefore, that at com-
mon law the mere act of assem-
bling was not unlawful, unless it was
for an unlawful purpose. Neither is
a peaceable assembly unlawful un-
der the present statute. It does not
condemn the mere act of assem-
bling on the street, but prohibits as-
sembling and congregating, cou-
pled with the doing of the forbid-
den acts. In other words, at com-
mon law the assembly must be for
an unlawful purpose, and when
three or more persons so assembled
the offense was complete without
the commission of any additional
overt criminal act; but here it re-
quires both the assembly and the
commission of one of the acts for-
bidden by the statute to constitute
unlawful assembly. Both the as-
sembling and the overt act are es-
sential to make the offense. It
would hardly be contended, there-
fore, that if defendants had met
on one of the spacious sidewalks
of Pennsylvania Avenue to conduct
a peaceable conversation, though
in a degree inconveniencing pedes-
trians, they would be guilty, un-
der the statute, of crowding and ob-
structing the free use of the walk.
Thus, it appears clear that the "con-
gregate and assemble" section of 1107
requires the presence of three or more
persons acting in concert for an un-
lawful purpose.3 The D.C. statute adds
an additional element to common law
unlawful assembly. Whereas common
law required three or more persons
with a common purpose, the statute
3. In the Jalbert case, op. cit., supra, the Court
referred to the assembling of the defendants in a
context that supports the Hunter rationale.
adds the commission of a forbidden
act, e.g., loud and boisterous, as a third
element. But to repeat, although the
defendant was loud and boisterous he
was not with three or more persons
with a common purpose and thus not
in violation of the statute.
The fact that this case was prosecuted
calls for some observations by the
Court. Prior to its research for this
opinion, the Court was unaware of the
Hunter decision and while sitting in
the D. C. Branch of the Court ob-
served a number of cases brought for
prosecution where a lone person was
loud and boisterous. Although the
Hunter case is a most significant case
concerning the interpretation of 1107, it
is not cited in the annotation of the
Code nor has it been cited in subse-
quent opinions of our appellate courts.
The obscurity of the opinion, however,
does not diminish its force. There be-
ing no evidence it has been overruled,
it is the law of this jurisdiction.
Prudence then would suggest that the
Office of the Corporation Counsel care-
fully examine the Hunter case and its
opinion of June 10, 1966, to determine
if its present prosecuting policies are in
accord. Further, as legal advisors to the
police, it would appear wise for them
to, by opinion, notify the police of any
change in policy to ensure the man on
the beat restricts his arrests under this
section of the Code to those where vio-
lation occurs-as the terms, congregate
and assemble, have been defined.
The Court wishes to make a further
observation on the information used in
this case. First, the information fails to
allege "congregate and assemble" even
though it is an element of the offense.
All elements of the offense charged
should be alleged. Secondly, in this case
even if there had been an allegation
including "congregate and assemble"
the information would be defective, as
inadequately vague under Hunter. The
right to be clearly apprised of a criminal
charge is constitutional in scope and can
not be avoided in this instance by the
more simplified rules of modern plead-
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ing or the relative obscurity of the
Hunter opinion.4
ORDERED that the defendant is
found not guilty of disorderly conduct
and discharged on that charge.
4. The requirement that the indictment be a
clear statement of the essential elements of the
offense effectuates two constitutional provisions:
The Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation in order to pre-
pare one's defense, and the Fifth Amendment pro-
tection against being put in jeopardy twice for the
same offense. Moore's Federal Practice, Cipes, Rules




THE MUTUAL OF NEW YORK
LIFE INSURANCE CO.
D.C. Gen. Sess., Civil No. GS 13741-66.
May 16, 1967. Opinion Per Edgerton, J.
Action for disability payments under in-
surance contract. Held, although plain-
tiff's failure to report disability within
required 20 days was not prejudical
due to defendant's actual knowledge,
the contradiction between written state-
ment of plaintiff's physician in plain-
tiff's proof of claim and said physician's
testimony upon cross-examination that
period of disability ended on approxi-
mately same date as termination date of
initial exclusion period under the pol-
icy causes a failure to establish the pe-
riod of disability by a preponderance of
the evidence.
Judgment for defendant.
CITY INVESTMENT CO., INC.
V.




D.C. Gen. Sess., Civil No. GS 5923-66,
GS 21173-66. June 6, 1967.
Motion to quash service of process up-
on non-resident corporation by substi-
tuted service upon the Commissioners
of the District of Columbia, and mo-
tions to consolidate for pre-trial pursu-
ant to Gen. Sess. Civ. R. 42 (a). Held,
such substituted service upon the Com-
missioners is valid under 13 D.C. Code
§ 331, and the consolidation is proper
where two causes of action emerge from
the same set of facts and transaction.
Motion to quash denied; motions to
consolidate granted.
EDGERTON, Judge
Motion to Quash Service of Process
The court has carefully considered
the record in this case including the dep-
osition of Ronald H. Moss, manager
of the corporate defendant, the argu-
ment of counsel, and the authorities
cited.
Before the recent trend of decision
as to amenability of non-resident cor-
porations to service of process (irre-
spective of whether or not such cor-
poration is "doing business" within the
forum jurisdiction), there would have
been little doubt that the defendant
corporation here would not have been
subject to service of process within the
District of Columbia. However, in the
light of the rather recent trend started
by the Supreme Court of the United
States in International Shoe Company
v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 318
(1945) and successively thereafter recog-
nized in McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U. S. 220 (1957), and
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235
(1958), the former strict standards have
unquestionably been relaxed and new
and different standards suggested. This
is particularly demonstrated by the de-
cision of the Fourth Circuit in 1961 in
Davis, Administratrix of the Estate of
Earl Sinclair Davis, Deceased v. St. Paul-
Mercury Indemnity Company opinion by
Chief Judge Sobeloff, 294 F. 2d 641, and
this reasoning is particularly applicable
to the situation we have here.
While the recent holding of our
Court of Appeals in Kelberine v. So-
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ciete Internationale, etc., decided April
7, 1966, - U.S. App. D. C.-,
363 F. 2d 989, may not reasonably be
applied to our situation here, it is
nevertheless an indication of the recog-
nition for this jurisdiction of this change
of judicial thinking on this question.
The court accordingly holds that the
service of process upon the Commis-
sioners of the District of Columbia, un-
der Title 13, §103 [§331?], D. C. Code,
in this action for damages "growing out
of any tort committed" in the District
of Columbia is valid, and the motion to
quash accordingly is denied.
Motions to Consolidate
These motions are addressed to the
sound discretion of the court under the
provisions of Rule 42 (a) of its Civil
Rules, and while no cases are cited to
the court controlling the exercise of its
discretion, it would appear that in the
interests of justice and in order to con-
serve the time of the court, the par-
ties, and the witnesses, that consolida-
tion for pre-trial and trial would be
appropriate. While the questions of law
and fact are different, the two causes
of action sought to be consolidated do
emerge from the same set of facts and
circumstances and the same transaction
or event, for proof of which the wit-
nesses in each action would very likely
be one and the same persons.








D.C. Gen. Sess., Crim. Nos. D.C. 176-67,
D.C. 1879-67. June 16, 1967
In both cases, defendants were charged
with disorderly conduct in that they,
inter alia, used profane language. Held,
(1) As to defendant Knight, there are
certain words so mild and generally in-
offensive that they as a matter of law
cannot be a violation of 22 D.C. Code
§1107. "Damn" is one of those words.
But, the use of "damn" could, in a
given situation, tend to cause breach of
the peace, and thus the conduct as a
whole would violate 22 D.C. Code
§1121. (2) With respect to Moore, the
court recognized that certain situations
could prompt one to use profane lan-
guage in the presence of others but di-
rected to no one in particular. The use
of such a word or expression is not
criminal conduct.
Motion for judgment of acquittal in
Knight case granted; Defendant Moore
found not guilty.
MURPHY, Judge
The Court tried defendants Albert
Knight and J. C. Moore on charges of
disorderly conduct, D. C. Code Section
22-1107, in separate trials during Janu-
ary and February of 1967. The cases
were taken under advisement.' The
Court has combined the cases for pur-
poses of this opinion since the issues
raised are common to both cases, and
finds each of the defendants not guilty.
1. The Facts-Knight
The undisputed facts in the Knight
case disclosed that about 7:15 P.M. on
December 29, 1966, in response to a
"man with a gun" call, a Metropolitan
Police Department detective and other
officers responded to the home of the
defendant located at 250 37th Street,
Southeast.
The detective went to the door of
the defendant's home, a one-family
dwelling, and knocked. The defendant
opened the door with one hand in his
pocket. The detective asked if there was
anyone in the home with a gun. The
defendant replied in the negative and
that the police had not been called. The
1. The excellent briefs submitted by counsel,
co-counsel and amicus curiae were of great assist-
ance to the Court.
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policeman ordered the defendant to
take his hand out of his pocket and the
defendant, in a loud voice, said: "No,
I won't take my damn hand out of my
damn pocket." (emphasis added).
The defendant was then placed un-
der arrest for disorderly conduct al-
though he protested he had not been
disorderly. The detective testified fur-
ther that about ten people had gathered
outside the house in response, he be-
lieved, to the presence of four police
cars. He further testified the radio-run
had been, it subsequently turned out,
for 250 37th Place,2 an address around
the corner. The officer further testified
the defendant was in his house during
the entire transaction and that the use
of "damn" twice constituted the disor-
derly conduct.a
The Facts-Moore
Private Thomas Munro, Metropoli-
tan Police Department, testified that
about 1 P.M. on January 7, 1967, he
was directing traffic at an intersection
in Southeast Washington. A D.C. Trans-
it bus driver stopped his bus, blew his
horn and motioned the officer over. The
officer responded and was told by the
bus driver "that the man sitting behind
him had been threatening him and al-
so he believed this man had a gun."
The officer invited the defendant off of
the bus, told him to keep his hands
out of his pockets. In response to ques-
tions by the officer, the defendant iden-
tified himself and denied threatening
the driver. The officer searched him and
2. The officer was acting in good faith in re-
sponding to the wrong address. Defense counsel in
its brief seeks to characterize the action of the
police officer in ordering the defendant to take his
hand from his pocket as unauthorized and unlaw-
ful. The Court rejects completely any suggestion
the police officer acted improperly in ordering de-
fendant to remove his hand from his pocket. As an
officer he had a duty to respond to a very dan-
gerous call. Self-preservation demanded he know
the contents of defendant's hand. The Court views
the officer's actions as necessary, reasonable, lawful,
and proper under the circumstances. Cf. Warden
v. Hayden, 35 U.S.L. Week 4993 (U.S. May 29,
1967).
3. At this point in the trial the defense moved
for a judgment of acquittal, which motion was
joined in by the Government.
found no gun. The bus driver mean-
while drove off without objection by the
police officer.
The officer testified he then told the
defendant he was free to go. The de-
fendant remonstrated, raising his voice,
telling the police officer he had no right
to ask him off the bus, and stating loud-
ly, "Go ahead, lock me up. What for? I
don't give a god-damn. Take me to the
precinct." The defendant also began to
follow the officer who was walking
away, tugging at his sleeve. At the time
the defendant was near a High's store
and three or four other people were on
the street within 75 feet. No one pro-
tested or appeared disturbed by defend-
ant's conduct. At the time of the
incident the officer stated the defendant
did not appear to have been drinking
and was very calm when first ap-
proached. However, "he was getting
madder by the minute." The defendant
was calm after arrest and when the of-
ficer took him to the call box.
The defendant testified on his own
behalf and stated he was on the bus and
had exchanged words with the driver,
but had not threatened him in any way.
The bus stopped and he got off at the
request of the police officer after being
accused by the driver of having a gun.
He admitted stating to the officer, "I
told you that son-of-a-bitch was lying. I
did not have no gun. Here you let him
go. Now I am on my way to work. I am
late. I am working on a new job." The
defendant freely admitted saying "son-
of-a-bitch," but denied other improper
words or touching the police officer. He
stated he had only one previous arrest
in 1957 for assault, which was dropped,
but had no other brushes with the law.
2. The Issues
Both defendants were charged under
22 D. C. Code 1107.4
4. D.C. Code, § 22-1107.
It shall not be lawful for any person or per-
sons within the District of Columbia to con.
gregate, and assemble in any street, avenue,
alley, road, or highway, or in or around any
public building or inclosure, or any park or
reservation, or at the entrance of any private
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Knight is alleged to have:
"in a private house... use[d]
profane language, indecent and ob-
scene words and engage[d] in dis-
orderly conduct in a place where
from the same could be heard in
said highway and in premises oth-
er than where the offense was com-
mitted."
Moore was accused of:
"Then and there us[ing] profane
language, indecent and obscene
words and did engage in loud and
boisterous talking and other dis-
orderly conduct."
The issues are:
1. Did either defendant use "profane
language" or "indecent and obscene
words" within the contemplation of the
statute?
2. Must convictions under Section
22-1107 include an additional showing
of tendency to breach the peace?
3. Was the Government's action here
with regard to the arrests, the charging,
the informations and the prosecution
within legally acceptable norms?
3. Legal Conclusions
The District of Columbia has two
statutory weapons with which it can
control general disorderly conduct-22
D.C. Code 1107 and 22 D.C. Code 1121.
building or inclosure, and engage in loud and
boisterous talking or other disorderly conduct,
or to insult or make rude or obscene gestures
or comments or observations on persons pass-
ing by, or in their hearing, or to crowd,
obstruct, or incommode, the free use of any
such street, avenue, alley, road, highway, or
any of the foot pavements thereof, or the free
entrance into any public or private building
or inclosure; it shall not be lawful for any per-
son or persons to curse, swear, or make use of
any profane language or indecent or obscene
words, or engage in any disorderly conduct
in any street, avenue, alley, road, highway,
public park or inclosure, public building,
church, or assembly room, or in any other
public place, or in any place wherefrom the
same may be heard in any street, avenue, alley,
road, highway, public park or inclosure, or
other building, or in any premises other than
those where the offense was committed ....
These two sections complement each
other. They are focused on different
kinds of disorderly behavior, and should
be so used. The District should not be
allowed to bring a blanket charge of
disorderly conduct and then prevail up-
on any statutory violation which
emerges from the facts at trial. Feeley
v. District of Columbia, -U.S. App.
D.C.- (No. 20275, decided May 22,
1967). Likewise, the Government ought
not to be able to switch charges in mid-
stream. If the charge is under one sec-
tion, then it must be so proven or fail.
But an important corollary to this is
that the District can charge under both
disorderly sections-quite possibly both
may be violated. Just as obviously,
finding of not guilty under one section
in no way means that the conduct
might not violate the other.
We deal in the present cases with al-
leged violations of section 1107 only.
The question is, does the language used
by these defendants come within the
reach of 1107? In arriving at a conclu-
sion, close attention must be paid to
the peculiar nature of the law and the
facts involved.
First, we deal with language, what the
defendants said, and not anything else
that they did. Freedom of expression as
guaranteed by the First Amendment is
the premise from which the Court must
work. The special privileged status of
language has been long emphasized by
the U.S. Supreme Court; infringements
upon it have been restricted to narrow-
ly defined, exceptional categories. See
e.g., Redrup v. New York, -U.S.- (Nos.
3, 16, 50, decided May 8, 1967); Ginz-
burg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957).
Second, we deal with a statute which
on its face proscribes language alone,
which requires no reaction or tendency
to breach the peace. In Duncan v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 219 A.2d 110 (D.C.
App. 1966), and Williams v. District
of Columbia, -D.C. App.-(No. 4037,
decided March 7, 1967), the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals up-
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held this application of 1107 against
challenges to its constitutionality. How-
ever, this Court, while controlled by
Duncan and Williams, still feels that it
must tread softly in the 1107 language
area because the U.S. Supreme Court
cases upon which Duncan and Williams
rely, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942), and Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), are both cases
in which the language was clearly pro-
vocative, clearly tended to breach the
peace. Further, there are U. S. Supreme
Court cases which indicate that some
tendency to breach the peace might
be constitutionally required, see e.g.,
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
(1949), Thompson v. City of Louisville,
362 U.S. 199 (1960). This Court feels
that while tendency to breach the peace
may not be necessary in all cases, some-
thing in addition to the bare conduct
itself must be shown, some apparent un-
reasonableness or grossness or deliberate
abusiveness.
Third, we deal with language which
can be offensive to be sure, "damn
hands" and "I don't give a god-damn,"
but which must rate relatively low on a
pofanity or obscenity scale.
Fourth, we deal with language not
addressed towards any specific person
present with intent to derogate that per-
son. These words were used more for
emphasis than for insult. 5
Finally, we deal with language
prompted by unusual or frustrating cir-
cumstances, situations in which any one
of us might be prompted to let loose a
single such epithet. And these reactions
are far too normal, too frequent, to
make criminal by general statute with
no other guidelines. Examples abound;
the bricklayer who drops a brick on his
foot, the Senators' fan hearing his team
lose another ball game, the rushed com-
muter watching his bus pull away, or
ripping his coat on the door. Are these
5. The qualifications referred to in this and the
two preceding paragraphs clearly distinguish the
recent District cases of Williams ("G-- d--- police-
man," "No s-- of a b--.) and Duncan ("No
black s-- of - b----, in-- f- cop") where convic-
tions under 1107 were upheld.
people legally criminals? Must their lot
rest entirely upon prosecutorial grace?
Must the law itself be so unrealistic and
inflexible?
Extracting from the above-stated com-
bination of law and circumstances, the
Court's holding is two-fold:
1. With respect to Knight, there are
certain words so mild and generally in-
offensive that they as a matter of law
cannot constitute a violation of 1107.
"Damn" is one of these words. This is
not to say, however, that use of the
word "Damn" cannot in a given sit-
uation well tend to cause breach of the
peace, and thus violate 1121.
2. With respect to Moore, there
are certain times in life when an
unexpected reversal of events can
prompt a relatively mild word or ex-
pression in the presence of others but
not directed towards anyone in particu-
lar. The use of such a word or expres-
sion is not criminal conduct. Therefore,
this Court's test is that when this word
or expression is:
1. said but one time
2. not patently offensive (The Court
would find "in- f- ," for
example patently offensive)
3. directly prompted by circumstances
so frustrating
4. that a reasonable man might well re-
act in the same way, and
5. not directed derogatorily towards
any particular person or persons
present
then, this language does not violate
1107. However, it must again be em-
phasized that in appropriate cases the
language may well constitute a viola-
tion of 1121. Amicus counsel for Knight,
during oral argument, urged on the
Court that a different standard of lan-
guage should be set depending on the
area of the city; that the people in the
inner city should be permitted to use
certain language not permissible in oth-
er sections of the city. The Court re-
jects this argument completely. It is
premised on the belief that some peo-
ple in the slums cannot, or will not,
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behave and that the rest of the people
in that section of the community ap-
prove of or tolerate their conduct. To
say some people in the slums cannot be-
have is to consider them animals, and
not the rational beings with free wills
that they are. To suggest they will not
behave is to admit as a city we are un-
able to control the lawbreakers. To say
the rest of the inner city approves of
disorderly conduct is just not so. To
permit relaxed standards of endorce-
merit of these statutes in the inner city
is to condemn the residents there to an
atmosphere of continual disorder. The
overwhelming majority of our citizens
are decent and law-abiding. Because
more criminals live in the slums, the
thousands of decent people in these
areas are potential victims of their ac-
tions every day. To maintain the peace,
there must be order and harmony in
the neighborhood. This can come about
only with each person respecting the
rights of others. To suggest that be-
cause the people are poor they should
be subject to the foulness, obscenities
and abuse of the disorderly person is to
inflict punishment on them because of
their status. The struggle of the poor to
better themselves cannot take place in a
world in which peace and human dig-
nity is destroyed by those who won't
behave.
4. The Present Enforcement of
Disorderly Conduct Law
Not only are the legal issues raised by
these cases of importance, the very ar-
rest and prosecution of defendants like
Moore, Knight, and Reed6 raise issues
concerning the administration of jus-
tice that require comment. The Court
is well aware of the admonition against
telling the executive branch how to con-
duct its business. 7 But when the con-
duct of this business results in arrests
without cause, the prosecution of cases
6. See this Court's opinion in District of Colum-
bia v. Donald Homer Reed, D. C. 2021-63, May 11,
1967.
7. United States v. Foster, 226 A.2d 164 (D.C.
App. 1967); United States v. Shaw, 226 A.2d 366
(D.C. App. 1967).
without merit, and the resulting burden
on an already over-worked court sys-
tem, some judicial comment seems in
order.
8
Over 21,028 charges of disorderly con-
duct were made by the police in fiscal
1966. Next to drunkenness, this repre-
sents the largest category of non-traffic
offenses reported in the District of
Columbia. An examination of the an-
nual police reports shows these figures
have been fairly stable over the past few
years. In spite of the large number of
persons arrested pursuant to the disor-
derly statute, the Police Department has
received little formal guidance from
the Office of the Corporation Counsel
and conducted an apparent insignifi-
cant amount of formal training on the
enforcement of the statute.
When a person is arrested for dis-
orderly conduct, he is taken to the pre-
cinct where he is booked (information
is placed on the arrest book). At that
time he is informed of the amount of
collateral, a dollar amount fixed by the
Court, by the posting of which he can
obtain his liberty. If one wishes, he can
state at the precinct that he elects to
forfeit his collateral and the case is
terminated at that point. If he wishes to
contest the arrest, he is given a court
date. If he is unable to post collateral,
lie is brought to court on the next court
day. A P.D. 255 form containing the
same information found on the arrest
book is prepared at the precinct and
sent to the Criminal Records Division
of the Police Department and the in-
formation transmitted to the official ar-
rest record of the defendant. As of this
time the arresting officer has made no
other report or any narrative statement
of the facts which led to the disorderly
arrest. In those cases where the de-
fendant is unable to post collateral or
8. The Court bases its information on the testi.
mony at this and other trials, on records and re-
ports cited in defense briefs and verified by the
Court, and on official Government reports and in-
formation concerning police training forwarded to
the Court by the Police Department. Counsel, in
oral argument, were advised by the Court of the




has stated he wishes a trial, the officer
goes to court on the date set. The officer
reports in that morning to the Corpora-
tion Counsel's Office where he prepares
a statement of facts which is examined
by the prosecutor and the prosecutor
then determines whether to drop the
charge at this point ("no paper" the
case) 0 or proceed to file an information.
If an information is prepared, the case
is sent to court where it is called and
heard that day. If the defendant fails to
respond to the call his security is for-
feited.
Because of this system outlined above,
the prosecution of disorderly conduct
cases is like an iceberg in that only a
small portion of arrests and penalties
becomes visible. In fiscal 196510 there
were 20,44611 charges of disorderly con-
duct filed by the Police Department. Of
these, 16,944 were disposed of by a for-
feiture of collateral. Of the remaining
3,500 charges, over 500 are "no papered"
or "nolle prossed" (dropped after pa-
pering but prior to trial) by the prose-
cutor. Somewhat less than 15% of the
cases go to court. Of them, 284 are dis-
missed by the prosecution in court and
about 80% of the remainder are con-
victed. 12 The most significant conclu-
sion drawn from the above statistics is
that about 17,000 disorderly charges are
filed each year by the police that are
never reviewed by the prosecutor or the
courts.
In Moore, the police officer indicated
that he had little formal training in the
9. Prior to January of 1967, no statement of
facts was prepared at all, and no screening of cases
took place before the trial itself. Even now, the
statement of facts is prepared solely for the use
of the prosecutor. No copies are retained in Police
Department files. Thus, there is no record of the
facts concerning the offense alleged for review by
police officials or anyone else; see 4 D.C. Code 134
A(l).
10. Since no overall figures are readily avail-
able for 1966, the fiscal 1965 statistics concerning
the enforcement of the disorderly statute will
suffice to give perspective.
11. In one part of the fiscal 1965 MPD Report,
it indicates 14,885 arrests; in another, 20,446
charges. Apparently 14,885 persons were arrested
and faced with 20,446 charges. In fiscal 1966 the
Report shows 21,028 charges and 15,935 arrests.
12. Wald and Hoffman, Report on Disorderly
Conduct (unpublished manuscript, July 16, 1966).
enforcing of the disorderly statute, but
believed he could enforce it in a rea-
sonable manner.13 What sort of train-
ing is provided the officer of the Police
Department? A police official advised
the Crime Commission:
"There are no written directives
or guides concerning the interpre-
tation and enforcement of the dis-
orderly conduct statutes .... The
statutes . ., are sufficiently detailed
so that further directives are not
necessary .... The Metropolitan Po-
lice Department has not encoun-
tered any difficulty in the enforce-
ment of the disorderly conduct stat-
utes from citizens, the Corporation
Counsel or the courts.' 4
The Training Division of the Police
Department has advised the Court that
they have no police directives concern-
ing disorderly conduct and that they
have only two policy directives from
the Corporation Counsel concerning the
disorderly statutes. The first, dated
March 1959, relates to picketing in con-
nection with labor disputes and its re-
lation to possible violation of the dis-
orderly conduct statutes; the second,
dated June 1966, relates to the author-
ity of a police officer to order persons
congregated on public streets to move
on. Further, the Police Training Divi-
sion gives one 50-minute lecture out of
a total of 535 hours of instruction in
the Police Training Academy on the
subject of disorderly conduct.
Thus, although it constitutes the sec-
ond highest non-traffic crime closed by
arrest in the District, disorderly con-
duct warrants 50 minutes of formal
training, no departmental regulations
or apparent supervision, little or no
13. The arresting officer testified he had re-
ceived no training other than the receipt of a copy
of the disorderly law. He further stated that he
could not define "profane," nor had he ever as a
policeman been instructed on what words constitute
profanity. He had, however, been through the
Training Academy and apparently received the
training discussed infra.
14. Letter from Deputy Chief Howard Covel to
the President's Commission on Crime in the District
of Columbia, April 19, 1966.
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formal guidance by the Corporation
Counsel, and legal or judicial review in
only a small percentage of cases.
As this Court noted in Reed and the
U. S. Court of Appeals more recently
noted in Feeley, the informations used
by the Corporation Counsel in disor-
derly conduct cases are defective. 15 Any
information that alleges profane, in-
decent or obscene language should set
forth the exact words allegedly used, so
that everyone-defendant, his counsel,
the Court, and the prosecutor-can de-
termine with precision what the case is
all about' 6 and what section of the Code
is violated.
The Effects of the Present System
and Recommendations
The instant cases demonstrate the re-
suits of the present practice. One need
only refer to the daily press to note
countless instances of police-community
relations problems that develop over the
enforcement of disorderly conduct stat-
utes. Without examination of this two-
way street (unfortunately viewed by
many as one-way) it is sufficient to say
no case should arise because a police
officer was unsure of the meaning of the
statute or what constituted violation of
it. Given clear guidelines of his author-
ity he can act within that authority
without the fear that his best inten-
tions will be later regarded as errone-
ously directed and possibly abusive.
Under present practices, the individ-
ual officer must define words like
"rude," "curse," "profane," only in light
of his own religion, education, en-
vironmental development and experi-
ence. If a policeman believes "damn"
is a crime, the hapless citizen who uses
the term in his own home may be
arrested.1
7
15. The Court notes that recent press contained
a statement attributed to the Corporation Counsel
indicating these forms will be revised.
16. Under present practice, all four of these
persons may remain in doubt until the arresting
officer has testified.
17. Officer Munro in Moore had a very common
sense rule of thumb in enforcing the statute in the
absence of little training: disorderly occurs if the
conduct would be offensive to others and other
And the policeman's dilemma is only
a part of the picture. The citizen, once
booked, can forfeit $10 or come to
court.1 8 In spite of the long hours
which our judges sit in court, it would
be safe to say that at least the better
part of a day is necessary to get the
witnesses ready and proceed to trial.
The loss in wages to a working de-
fendant immediately becomes more than
the collateral already posted, without
any consideration of possible addition-
al penalty or attorney's fees. 10 General-
ly, the only cases that get to court in-
volve the man who is indigent at arrest
or one who wishes to litigate as a mat-
ter of principle. As a result, only 15%
get to court while thousands are being
arrested, booked and released with no
people were around who might be offended by it.
The only difficulty with this rule is that if an officer
believes "damn" is profane, it is safe to assume he
would believe it is offensive to others. So, absent
guidelines, arrest would still be up to the officer's
personal viewpoint.
18. The collateral system in theory is designed
to ensure the presence of person in court, but of
course in fact ensures just the opposite. If all
offenders who posted collateral came to court, the
wheels of justice in the Court of General Sessions
might grind to a stop. So, we really have what
ends up as enforcement for revenue. The Court
believes that time in jail should be given a dollar
value of $1.25 per hour. Generally, any person who
has been unable to post $10 collateral after eight
hours would be released. Perhaps this should not
apply to potential chronic alcoholics or multiple
offenders, but it would eliminate the present dis-
crimination against the poor. The prosecutor could
always seek warrants for flagrant offenders.
19. Disorderly conduct carries a maximum pen-
alty of $250 and/or 90 days for each offense. It
would appear most people with a criminal record
would forfeit collateral instead of litigating a case
when by putting the prosecutor to his proof they
risk 90 days in jail.
There is the viewpoint that a man is penalized
for going to trial and the collateral system is in-
herently coercive because of the high price one
might pay for his day in court.
The collateral system poses a real dilemma to the
trial judge. He has the power and the duty to fix
punishment according to the law. Any rule that
stated no punishment would be greater than the
forfeiture would allow the man of means to commit
offenses at will knowing that he will suffer only a
small monetary fee even if he litigates. To give a
greater penalty than collateral may be in the best
interest of the accused (e.g., probation) or society
yet appears a greater penalty because of a trial.
Perhaps the answer lies in a combination of the
ideas suggested in this opinion. If first offenders
were generally sent to school and flagrant or repeat
offenders prosecuted in spite of posting collateral,
the range of people who would be faced with the
present inequities would be few.
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visible supervision by anyone over the
officer's judgment. The prosecutor, even
under the new screening program, sees
only a small percentage of cases, and
the Court an even smaller number. If
the Reed and Knight cases reflect the
type of cases the prosecutor believes
should be prosecuted, one can only
speculate as to what evidence forms a
basis for those "no papered." With the
hardship and costs generally involved
in going to trial and the difficulty of
expunging an arrest record even where
cleared, it is of paramount importance
that each disorderly arrest be proper in
the first instance. How can this come
about?
The Board of Judges of the Court is
somewhat limited in what it can do to
ensure the careful and proper adminis-
tration of the disorderly statutes.
The Board could abolish the collat-
eral system which is not practical. It
can support and encourage the use of
street citation and stationhouse release
and can rule on the issues and merits
of each individual case. Beyond that the
courts are generally limited.
The leadership in reform in this area
must come from the Office of the Cor-
poration Counsel and the Police De-
partment. Without waiting for a new
statute,20 the following views are set
forth to stimulate thinking in the execu-
tive branch and encourage immediate
action to correct the long-neglected
deficiencies in the administration of the
disorderly statutes.
Police Training: The Police Academy
training should be substantially in-
creased-of course not proportionate to
the number of arrests, but enough to
ensure some uniformity of opinion on
those sections of the disorderly statute
where presently there are divergent
views. The precinct training should be
regular and reflect the views of the Cor-
poration Counsel and the courts. There
appears no reason why a monthly bul-
letin could not be distributed by the
Corporation Counsel to the police in a
newsletter form explaining new court
20. E.g., the ALI Model Penal Code.
rulings, noting improper disorderly ar-
rests and why they were improper. The
U. S. Attorney's Office has given hours
of lectures to the police and found the
individual officers eager to learn and
anxious to get the right information.
Anyone who believes the police don't
want to make good cases each time they
arrest has an erroneous notion of our
police officers' devotion to duty.
Police Records: The IACP Report
2'
urged the keeping of accurate records
in disorderly cases. There is a need for
a form that should be filled out in
every disorderly case that clearly shows
through check-off boxes or statements
the nature of the disorderly conduct in-
volved. Where words are involved that
form a basis for a charge, they should
be set out in the statement.
These forms should be made in at
least duplicate. After review by the of-
ficer's superior, one copy should be
filed, the other forwarded to the Office
of the Corporation Counsel. The police
supervisory staff could then make a con-
stant check on how their men are en-
forcing the statute. The prosecutor
would also supervise enforcement of the
statute he is duty-bound to enforce with
increased visibility over the great ma-
jority of cases which result in forfeits.
The prosecutor could then not only
ensure the police are enforcing a stat-
ute, that results in many arrests, prop-
erly, but in appropriate cases could ob-
tain warrants and prosecute the flagrant
offenders.22 It is ironic that a man be
prosecuted for saying "damn" in his liv-
ing room, yet a person with $10 may
engage in the foulest form of disorder-
ly conduct and never risk coming to
court. The staff limitation of the Cor-
poration Counsel's Office presently im-
21. Survey of the Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment, Washington, D. C., by the International As-
sociation of Chiefs of Police, April 1966. This report
recognizes the need for accurate reports with nar-
rative statement and review by supervisors. The
Court would favor any system that gives facts and
effective supervisory review.
22. Under an order of the Court of General
Sessions dated April 19, 1965, the police can in
unusual cases call a judge and ask that a higher
bond or collateral be set. This right is rarely in-
voked.
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poses limitations on any attempt to
properly supervise the enforcement of
the disorderly statutes. However, the
cost of an increased staff seems small
considering the benefits to be reaped
by ensuring that only the proper per-
sons are arrested and that the really
serious offenders are prosecuted and
dealt with according to law, not just
permitted to pay out.23
A most important function the Cor-
poration Counsel could play would be
in preparing opinions clearly defining
the various sections of the disorderly
statute. Some guidance could be given
in the type of words that either are or
are not lawful. If lists of so-called
"trigger words" can be spelled out, cer-
tainly words like "damn" and perhaps
other more common four-letter words
can be classified as proper or improper.
Stationhouse release might well be
desirable in many disorderly cases, and
the Corporation Counsel's endorsement
of proposed changes in the law per-
mitting a broad use of stationhouse re-
lease is highly commendable.
By such means the police and prose-
cutor could enforce the disorderly stat-
ute in a meaningful way with minimal
risk of bad cases developing. The Court
believes in the long run the laws would
be strengthened by new procedures be-
cause the serious offender would be
punished and not just permitted to for-
feit collateral, and the doubtful trans-
gressor free from an arrest record and
perhaps a permanent resentment to-
ward the Police Department.
The Court, in closing, again notes its
awareness of its limitations and its lack
of authority to tell the police and pros-
ecutor what to do. The suggestions are
herein made for their consideration
and evaluation because the problems
were squarely set out by counsel's brief.
23. One suggestion might be a school similar
to traffic school where offenders could in lieu of
prosecution receive instruction on the rule of law,
citizenship responsibility, police-community rela-
tons and similar subjects. Such a school might be
operated in the existing traffic school facility by
the police or perhaps as a community service pro-
ject by a local law school, the Bar Association or the
excellent service organization presently working
with the court, the Citizens Information Service.
However limited the court authority is
over the police and prosecutor, in the
interest of its self-preservation, it must
speak out where, because of inadequate
training and lack of supervision, trivial
cases are on the court's dockets. As the
Chief Judge noted in his semi-annual
report to the Attorney General, we
need five more judges to cope with our
present workload.24 This being the case,
judicial time should not be spent hear-
ing cases involving people who say
"damn" in their living rooms.
The disorderly conduct statutes are
necessary to maintain order and are
very valuable tools of law enforcement.
Police and prosecutors should not let
the tools become worn or lost by court
decisions because they were not sharp-
ened up to meet the present demands
of our society and the law.
ORDERED (1) That the Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal in the Knight
case is granted;
(2) that the defendant
Moore is found not
guilty;
and (3) that the defendants
be returned their col-
lateral posted with
the Court.
24. Chief Judge Greene's Report to the Attorney
General, March 1967.
Edith KOGOD and Samuel Kogod
V.
David L. WEINSTEIN
D.C. Gen. Sess., Civil No. M 12212-62.
July 26, 1967. Opinion Per Edgerton, J.
Action for damages arising out of an
automobile accident. Motion for new
trial by plaintiff. Held, that the court
erred in granting defendant's requested
instruction to the jury that by reason
of the failure of either driver to report
the accident to the police within 5 days
required by 40 D.C. Code § 426 the
jury might infer that neither driver be-
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lieved the accident involved bodily in-
jury or property damage in excess of
$100. Such statutes are not intended to
affect the civil rights of the parties and
are merely intended as police regula-
tions; said error was prejudicial.
Motion for new trial granted.
Shirley A. CURTIS
V.
INTERNATIONAL INN, INC. et. al.
D.C. Gen. Sess., Civil No. GS-9132-67
and GS-9133-67. Aug. 9,,1967.
Motions to dismiss in actions for dam-
ages for malicious prosecution and false
imprisonment. Held, a complaint in a
malicious prosecution action, which ap-
pears on its face to allege that the ar-
rest and search were effected by "cor-
rupt means", is legally sufficient and
states a claim upon which relief may be
granted; a false imprisonment suit must
be brought within the one year statu-
tory period which begins to run when
the defendant is released on bond.
Motion to dismiss in malicious prose-
cution action denied. Motion to dismiss
in false imprisonment action granted.
EDGERTON, Judge
On May 18, 1965, Shirley Curtis was
arrested on the premises of the Inter-
national Inn. She was subsequently
charged with Vagrancy, Disorderly Con-
duct and violation of the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act (see informations
D.C. 1378-65; D.C. 1379-65; and U.S.
4310-65, respectively). On May 19, 1965,
plaintiff was released on bail. After trial
by the court sitting without a jury, she
was convicted on all charges. On ap-
peal, the convictions were reversed, and
she was discharged from custody, Shirley
A. Curtis v. United States, 222 A.2d
840 (1966). As stated by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, Quinn, J.:
"We... hold that appellant's ini-
tial arrest for vagrancy was unlaw-
ful." (Curtis, supra, at 841-2)
"We hold that appellant's arrest
for disorderly conduct cannot
stand." (Ibid., at 842)
"[W]e hold that the search of ap-
pellant's pocketbook and the seiz-
ure of narcotics paraphanalia were
likewise unlawful, and that all evi-
dence concerning the contraband
was therefore inadmissible." (Ibid.,
at 842)
On April 20, 1967, Shirley Curtis,
plaintiff herein, filed two actions for
damages, one for malicious prosecution,
and the other for false arrest and im-
prisonment. The present motions to
dismiss were filed in both cases.
In the suit for malicious prosecution
G.S. 9133-67, the motion to dismiss was
filed in behalf of defendant Kuntz, a
police officer, on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a claim against
him upon which relief can be granted.
The other four four named defendants
have not been served with process.
The motion is denied for the follow-
ing reasons: In Bumphus v. Smith, 189
A.2d 130 (1963), the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals stated the rule
which governs such cases in the District
of Columbia:
"To maintain his action .(for ma-
licious prosecution) it was incum-
bent on appellant to allege and
prove (1) the initiation of the
criminal proceedings by appellee,
(2) with malice and (3) without
probable cause, and (4) termination
of the proceeding in favor of ap-
pellant. (ibid., at 131)
"The majority rule, and what we
consider the better rule, is that a
prior conviction, although set aside
or reversed and followed by an ac-
quittal, is conclusive evidence of the
existence of probable cause, unless
the conviction was procured by
fraud, perjury or other corrupt
means."
The question accordingly presented by
the motion to dismiss is whether or not
the complaint charges that the alleged
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unlawful arrest and search were occa-
sioned by "fraud, perjury, or other
corrupt means". As a matter of plead-
ing, the allegations of the complaint,
incorporating as they do the more de-
tailed allegations of the complaint in
the other suit, G.S. 9132-67, appear on
their face to allege "corrupt means"
within the intendment of Bumphus, and
accepting these allegations as true for
the purposes of the motion, are legally
sufficient to state a claim for relief.
In the suit for false imprisonment,
G.S. 9132-67, the motion to dismiss is
filed by defendants Kuntz and Mott, the
police officers, the other three defend-
ants not having been served with proc-
ess. The motion to dismiss raises the
bar of the one year statute of limita-
tions (12 D.C. Code 201, 1961). The
question therefore presented under the
allegations of the complaint is when
the instant cause of action for false ar-
rest and false imprisonment "accrued".
No decided case in the District of
Columbia on this question has been
discovered. However, the rule in other
jurisdictions, with similar statutory lan-
guage, is that an action for false im-
prisonment must be brought within the
statutory period which begins to run
when the defendant is released on
bond. Jedzierowski v. Jordan, 172 A.2d
636 (Maine, 1961); Mobley v. Broome,
102 S.E.2d 496 (N.C. 1958); Belflower
v. Blackshere, 281 P.2d 423, 49 A.L.R.
2d 917 (Okl. 1955). Here the defend-
ant was released on bond on May 19,
1965, and the complaint was filed on
April 20, 1967, clearly beyond the one-
year period of limitations.
Accordingly, the motion of defend-
ants Kuntz and Mott to dismiss the
complaint is granted.
It is suggested that counsel for plain.
tiff file an amended complaint in G.S.
9133-67 to include the allegations of the
complaint in G.S. 9132-67, which is
hereby dismissed, so that the amended
complaint can stand alone without the
necessity for incorporation by reference





D.C. Gen. Sess., Crim. Div., Traf. Nos.
TR 15651-67, 15738-67. Aug. 24, 1967.
Opinion Per Murphy, J.
Defendant was charged under Part I,
Article VI, Section 22 (a) of the Traffic
Regulations with operating vehicle at
greater than reasonable speed and with
possession of mutilated permit. Held,
charge under Section 22 (a) is not fatally
ambiguous merely because the Gov-
ernment can show either that defend-
ant exceeded the speed limit or was
within the speed limit but due to sur-
rounding circumstances was driving at
an excessive rate; but possession of mu-
tilated driver's permit does not con-
stitute offense.
Defendant accordingly found guilty
of unreasonable speed and not guilty




D.C. Gen. Sess., Crim. Div., Traf. No.
TR 16834-67. Aug. 24, 1967. Opinion
Per Murphy, J.
Hearing upon defendant's motion to
dismiss for failure to state offense in
prosecution for, operating motor ve-
hicle in such manner as to cause it to
strike fixed object in highway. It was
not alleged that the charge violated
any specific section of the Traffic Regu-
lations. Held, since the prosecutor was
later able to ascertain the section vio-
lated (Section 116.2 of the Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Regulations), the charge
was proper.






D.C. Gen. Sess., Crim. Div., Traf. No.
TR 15836-67. Sept. 15, 1967. Opinion
Per Murphy, J.
Defendant was charged with operating
vehicle at speed in excess of 30 miles
per hour. On the ticket, defendant's
speed was alleged to be 45 miles per
hour. The arresting officer testified that
defendant was travelling at 47 miles
per hour and on cross examination ad-
mitted to being hazy on the details of
the arrest. Held, inconsistency between
speed shown on ticket and that testified
to by officer raises a reasonable doubt
in the mind of court.





D.C. Gen. Sess., Crim Div., Traf. No.
TR 15782-67. Sept. 15, 1967. Opinion
Per Murphy, J.
Defendant was charged with a viola-
tion of Part I, Article VI, Section 22 (c)
of the Traffic Regulations in that she
failed to reduce the speed of her ve-
hicle when approaching an intersection.
Held, failure to slow at an intersection
alone does not violate the law, absent
some showing by the government that
such failure to slow was unreasonable
or imprudent under the circumstances.




D.C. Gen. Sess., Crim. No. U.S. 7640-67.
Sept. 18, 1967. Opinion Per Greene, C.J.
Application for further reduction of
bond. Original bond was set at $25,000,
later reduced to $5,000 by the same
judge. Held, under the Bail Reform
Act, defendant is entitled to only one
review by the judicial officer who im-
posed the original conditions, and
thereafter may only apply to the United
States District Court for an amend-
ment of the original order; but the
judge at preliminary hearing may re-




Joseph R. SOSA, Jr. et al.
D.C. Gen. Sess., Oct. 23, 1967. Opinion
Per Greene, C.J.
Applications by attorneys for compen-
sation under the Criminal Justice Act.
Amounts requested exceeded the maxi-
mum set by the court. Held, payments
in excess of the maximum will be ap-
proved only if extraordinary circum-
stances are shown.




P.C. Gen. Sess., Small Claims No. C 12912-
67. Oct. 25, 1967.
Suit by lessee to recover full amount of
rent paid upon allegedly illegal oral
contract to lease housing accommoda-
tions. Held, such contract is void and
unenforceable by either party because
facilities and accommodations were of-
fered in violation of the Housing Reg-
ulations of the District of Columbia, and
that landlord is not entitled to offset for
expenses incurred in adapting premises
to plaintiff's occupancy.
Judgment entered for plaintiff.
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EDGERTON, Judge
In this case of apparent first impres-
sion, the court is asked to rule that an
oral contract to lease housing accom-
modations in the District of Columbia
is void and unenforceable by either of
the parties where the facilities and ac-
commodations offered were below the
required standards and in violation of
the Housing Regulations of the District
of Columbia. It also appears that the
Certificate of Occupancy issued to the
defendant landlord did not permit a
family of the size of the plaintiff lessee's
to occupy the premises.
The court has carefully considered
the thorough briefs submitted by coun-
sel for the plaintiff and accepts as a
correct statement of the law the rule of
Hartman v. Lubar, 77 U. S. App. D. C.
95, 96, cert. den. 319 U. S. 767:
"that an illegal contract, made in
violation of a statutory provision
designed for police or regulatory
purposes, is void and confers no
right upon the wrongdoer."
The novel question here, as already
suggested, is whether this rule extends
to a contract rendered illegal by rea-
son of (a) the Housing Regulations
and (b) the insufficiency of the Certifi-
cate of Occupancy. No persuasive rea-
sons suggest themselves to the court as
to why any distinction should be made
between contracts entered into in viola-
tion of the Housing Regulations as op-
posed to contracts rendered illegal for
any other of numerous reasons.
It accordingly appears that plaintiff
is entitled to recover the full amount
of $80.00 which she paid to the de-
fendant at the time the oral contract
was entered into.
Defendant asserts that if plaintiff is
found to be entitled to recover the
$80.00 he is entitled to an offset for
certain expenses which he advanced for
necessary moving of furniture to adapt
the premises for plaintiffs use and oc-
cupancy. While this contention has
caused the court some concern it is now
persuaded that no rights were vested in
either party under this illegal contract
and inasmuch as the instant illegality
was due to a provision of law, i.e., the
Housing Regulations, ignorance of this
law is no excuse, particularly as to a
landlord. Accordingly, the defendant
advanced such funds at his own peril
and is not entitled to offset the amount
so advanced against plaintiff's claim. cf.
Restatement of Contracts I, § 599.
Judgment will accordingly be entered
on the 30th day of October, 1967 for





D.C. Gen. Sess., Crim. No. US 3606-67.
Jan. 4, 1968. Opinion Per Halleck, J.
Motion to review $10,000 bond pre-
viously set. Held, such motion should
be denied when the court has no in-
formation on which to base a meaning-
ful review, and the United States Dis-
trict Court is the more logical forum
when defendant is currently awaiting
trial there, even though the United
States Court of Appeals has ruled that
such motion must be heard by the judge






D.C. Gen. Sess., Civ. No. GS 13031-67.
Jan. 12, 1968.
Action for wrongful repossession of
automobile wherein plaintiff sought
both compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. Held, even if plaintiff owed de-
fendant collateral debt for towing
charge, he was not in default of pay-
ment, and nothing in the conditional
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sales contract or the law authorized de-
fendant to repossess; plaintiff is entitled
to punitive as well as compensatory due
to defendant's malice and bad faith in
obtaining possession of the automobile
by falsely persuading plaintiff that it
was being towed to the District of
Columbia for his benefit and that he
could obtain possession upon payment
of a much lower towing charge than
that later demanded.
Verdict accordingly for plaintiff.
GREENE, Chief Judge
This is an action for the wrongful re-
possession of an automobile. Plaintiff
seeks both compensatory and punitive
damages.
Plaintiff James Smith purchased an
automobile from G. B. Enterprises, Inc.,
T/A Lee Ford, in December 1965 for
a total price (including the finance
charges) of $3,968.851 on which he made
a down payment of $1,000, the remain-
der to be financed by Franklin Invest-
ment Company under a conditional
sales contract. The payments under this
contract were stipulated to be $86.63
per month. Smith had made three regu-
lar payments (in January, February, and
March, 1966) when the automobile
broke down 2 in North Carolina and was
placed in a repair shop in Greenwood.
Smith apparently felt he would have
some difficulty returning the auto-
mobile, and after discussions with
Franklin Investment, the company of-
fered to have the car towed back for
approximately $45.3 Smith thereupon
1. The cash sales price was $3,195 and the fi-
nance charges were $773.85. There was also a
$150.00 charge for insurance.
2. The motor was reported to have failed, or
blown up.
3. Plaintiff testified that he was told by Frank-
lin's vice president that the car would be returned
for $45, and on one of his cards that same vice
president wrote, "If Lee Ford does not pay Mr.
Treadwell to bring up '63 Cadillac, Franklin will
lay out approximately $45.00." In light of this, the
defense testimony that it was explained to Smith
that the cost would be approximately $200 is un-
persuasive.
authorized the Greenwood garage to re-
lease the car to Franklin Investment for
the purpose of having it returned here.
On April 4, 1966, Smith made his
fourth regular monthly payment on the
loan; 4 yet on April 6, 1966, Franklin
Investment repossessed the automobile
for non-payment of towing charges
amounting to $230. Subsequently,
Franklin resold the car for a total of
$3,806.78 (including finance charges)5
after having expended $330.89 for re-
placing the motor which had become
damaged in North Carolina.
II
The basic question here is whether
defendant was justified in repossessing
the automobile on account of Smith's
failure to pay $230 in towing charges
when at the time of the repossession
Smith was not in default of either the
principal or the interest on the loan.
It is Franklin's view that under the con-
ditional sales contract and under gen-
eral law it was entitled to repossession
notwithstanding the current status of
the loan payments.
The first difficulty with Franklin's po-
sition is that-even assuming its major
premise to be correct 6-Smith was never
advised that the towing charges would
amount to $230 or that his failure to
pay such an amount would cause the re-
possession of the automobile.
As the evidence shows, the represen-
tation was made to Smith that the tow-
ing charges would amount only to $45,
and it was reliance upon that repre-
sentation that Smith authorized the re-
lease of the automobile to Franklin
Investment. 7 It was only later, when
4. The payment was made by a money order
mailed on April 4, 1966. The money order was
received by Franklin in April and cashed by that
company on November 15, 1966.
5. The cash sales price this time was $2,795.00;
the finance charges $1,011.78; and the insurance
$149.00. The new purchaser paid down $200.00
and traded in an automobile worth $335.00. His
monthly payments were $95.02.
6. But see [text at notes 11, 121 infra.
7. Plaintiff testified that, if necessary, he could
have had the automobile returned without Frank-
lin's assistance, and that he "had the money to
put in the car."
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Franklin8 safely had possession, that a
$230 towing figure was assessed,9 and
repossession was justified on the basis
of the $230 figure. Under these circum-
stances, Franklin at best had a right to
hold the automobile pending payment
of $45 (which Smith presumably could
have raised); there was no conceivable
justification for holding and selling the
car for non-payment of $230.
Even more significant is the fact that,
according to plaintiff, he was not ad-
vised prior to the repossession that the
car would be repossessed'O and sold un-
less he paid the towing expenses.11
Franklin's vice president disputed this
testimony, and claimed having advised
Smith in March that the towing ex-
penses would have to be paid if Smith
wanted to avoid repossession. But plain-
tiff's version is corroborated by the fact
that he made the regular monthly pay-
ment on the loan on April 4-some-
thing he hardly would have done if he
had been told, as Franklin asserts, that
unless he immediately also came up
with an additional $230 the automobile
would be repossessed. Payment by Smith
of the regular April installment is con-
sistent only with his understanding that
the making of this payment would fore-
stall repossession. It certainly is not
consistent with Franklin's version that
Smith was advised and understood that
only immediate payment of $230 in ad-
dition to the April installment would
save the automobile from repossession.
III
But there is an even more funda-
mental flaw in Franklin's case. Nothing
in the conditional sales contract or the
8. Or Lee Ford, the dealer. See note 14, infra.
9. Franklin produced bills showing that it paid
$230 for towing, but the expenses of the retaking
were listed on the repossession notice as amounting
to only $50.
10. Indeed, plaintiff said that Franklin did not
even advise him that the automobile was back here.
11. After the repossession, Franklin demanded
the full amount of the debt, including the expenses
of retaking, for a total of $2,908.96, as a prereq-
uisite to avoiding a sale. This amount included
interest for 36 months even though the car had
been in plaintiff's possession for only four months.
law generally authorized Franklin to
repossess the automobile for non-
payment of the towing charges, whatever
their amount. An automobile may, of
course, be repossessed, among other rea-
sons, for failure to pay principal and
interest on the loan, but there was no
such failure here. There is no legal
authority permitting Franklin to re-
possess the automobile on account of
non-payment of a collateral debt.
12
Franklin would not have been author-
ized to repossess this car if Smith had
been in default on some other loan
made for another purpose, such as, for
example, for the purchase and financ-
ing of a second automobile (cf. Wil-
liams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
121 U.S. App. D.C. 315, 350 F.2d 445
(1965)), and it is no better off merely
because this collateral debt had a rela-
tionship to this particular car. More-
over, it may well be doubted that
Franklin would even have attempted a
forcible repossession if it had not al-
ready obtained possession of the car as
a result of subterfuge.
In short, the repossession was unjus-
tified and wrongful. It remains to be
determined what amount of damages
should be assessed.
IV
At the time of the repossession, plain-
tiff owed no more than $2,195 on the
12. Franklin relies upon the fact that legal
title remained with it until all installments were
paid in full. But all installments were paid when
due, and Franklin's title, whatever it was, hardly
entitled it to repossession in the absence of a de-
fault. Franklin further argues that under the con-
tract it had a right to protect its security; that any
funds expended in doing so (the towing charge)
could be charged to the debtor's account under
the conditional sales contract; and that failure to
make the payment authorizes repossession. But no
contractual provision or legal authority is cited in
support of this conclusion, and there appears to
be none. Franklin also relies upon a clause in the
contract which permits repossession if the auto-
mobile is "stolen or damaged by accident, fire
or otherwise," claiming that the North Carolina
damage to the motor was in that category. The
Court does not construe this clause as permitting
a repossession (with the drastic consequence of the
entire amount of the debt becoming due immedi-
ately) when there is damage to the car amounting
to as little as 10-15% of its value. If such were the
the effect of the clause, no debtor would be safe
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automobile.18 According to Franklin's
own witness, the car at that time was
worth at least $2,464.11 (the $2,795 new
cash sales price less $330.89 for the new
motor). Thus, Smith's equity in the
automobile at that time and his actual
loss as a result of the repossession
amounted to a minimum of $269.11.
The profit to Franklin and/or the deal-
er resulting from that repossession was
not less than $623.56.14 Nevertheless,
whatever the profit to Franklin, Smith
from repossession whenever a repair to the auto-
mobile appeared necessary or indicated.
13. The unpaid balance at the time of the pur-
chase was $2,195 (other than future interest for
which plaintiff obviously cannot be charged in this
computation). Plaintiff made four payments of
$86.63 each, but the evidence does not show how
much of each payment is attributable to principal
and how much to interest. Under the circum-
stances, the Court cannot credit plaintiff with any
part of these payments. Plaintiff was also charged
with insurance amounting to $150, but most of this
was presumably returnable in view of the repos-
session. For these reasons, the present ruling is
without prejudice (1) to a showing by plaintiff
that by his four payments the principal of the loan
was reduced, and (2) to a showing by the defendant
how much of the insurance premium is not re-
turnable. If such showings are made before the
judgment is entered, the amount of the compensa-
tory damages will be adjusted accordingly. Frank-
lin will not be credited with the towing charges
because (1) the towing was for Franklin's benefit
rather than for plaintiff, and (2) as indicated, this
is a collateral debt. Even collaterally, no more than
$45 would be allowable.
14. The maximum amount which Franklin and/
or the dealer would have realized had they not re-
possessed the car was the amount of the time price
to the plaintiff (cash sales price of $3,195. plus
finance charges of $773.85), that is, a total of
$3,968.85. As a result of the repossession, Franklin
and/or the dealer stand to realize far more. The
sale to the second purchaser, following the repos-
session, brought $2,795 as a cash sales price plus
$1,011.78 in finance charges, or a total of $3,806.78.
In addition, Franklin and/or the dealer had already
pocketed plaintiff's $1,000 down payment and his
four monthly payments totalling $346.52. When
these two figures are added to the total amount to
be realized from the second sale, Franklin and/or
the dealer will have received a total of $5,153.30.
From this should be deducted the expenses which
defendant may have incurred as a result of the re-
possession ($230 for towing and $330.89 for a new
motor), leaving Franklin and/or the dealer with
a combined net from both transactions amounting
to $4,592. This is $623.56 more than the maximum
these companies would have realized had the car
never been repossessed and had plaintiff's pay-
ments simply continued as per the agreement with
him. It appears that for practical purposes Frank-
lin and the dealer conducted business with Smith
as if their interests were identical (e.g., the arrange-
ments for returning the automobile from North
Carolina were with Franklin but the car was
actually returned to Lee Ford, the dealer).
will be allowed as compensatory dam-
ages only the amount of his actual loss,
or $269.11.
Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages.
Such damages are awarded to punish
for malice or outrageous conduct, par-
ticularly if the wrong is of such nature
that an example, by way of deterrent
and warning, is justified in the public
interest. United Securities Corp. v.
Franklin, 180 A.2d 505 (Mun. App.
D.C. 1962); Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co. v. Clay, 90 U.S. App. D.C.
206, 194 F.2d 888 (1952); Oleck, Dam-
ages to Persons and Property, p. 541
(1957 ed.). As the U. S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit phrased it,
punitive damages may be awarded
where the injury was done "recklessly
so as to imply a disregard of social ob-
ligations" ( Lampert v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 372 F.2d 245, 248 (C.A. 9, 1967)).
Malice and bad faith are clearly pres-
ent here. Franklin obtained possession
of the automobile by persuading Smith,
falsely, first, that $45 would return the
automobile to Baltimore, and second,
that the car was being returned for his
benefit.15 Then, as soon as Franklin had
secured possession by these representa-
tions, it repossessed the vehicle on the
pretext of non-payment of much higher
towing charges, notwithstanding that
Smith continued faithfully to make the
payment called for under the condition-
al sales contract.
Franklin's actions in this case showed
a complete contempt for plaintiff's
rights and his investment of well over
$1,000. Finance companies must under-
stand that debtors, too, have rights; that
the courts will protect these rights; and
that a violation may well turn out to
be expensive. Punitive damages are par-
ticularly well suited for the administra-
tion of that lesson. District Motor Co.
v. Rodill, 88 A.2d 489 (Mun. App. D.C.
1952); Afro-American Publishing Co. v.
Jaffe, 125 U.S. App. D.C. 70, 366 F.2d
15. That is the necessary implication from the
testimony. Smith would hardly have authorized
release of an automobile in which he had a sub-
stantial equity solely to make it easier for Franklin
:o repossess it.
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649 (1966); Safeway Trails, Inc. v.
Schmidt, 225 A.2d 317 (D.C. Ct. App.
1967).
The plaintiff will be awarded puni-
tive damages in the amount of $1,000,




FIRST NATIONAL REALTY CORP.
D. C. Gen. Sess., Crim. No. DC 16958-67
et al. Jan. 26, 1968. Opinion Per
Murphy, J.
Adjudication of sentence upon entry of
judgment after plea of nolo contendere
to 19 violations of zoning, plumbing,
building, and housing regulations. Held,
leniency should not be granted even
though defendant was negotiating
sale of premises to a buyer who would
make needed corrections, was frustrated
by vandals in its efforts to repair, and
was lulled by lax enforcement and
prosecution of the regulations. Defend-
ant should not be allowed to delay re-
pair without regard to those living in
the building and should receive the
severest penalties as a deterrent.
Defendant corporation fined $5,000.
Clark E. FINKS
V.
DEAN VAN LINES, INC.
D.C. Gen. Sess., Civ. No. GS 17521-65.
Jan. 29, 1968.
Action by bailee for hire as third party
plaintiff against insurer as third party
defendant whose policy was in effect at
time plaintiff's loss was discovered.
Held, when loss is discovered during
term of defendant insured's bearing of
risk, a presumption arises that the loss
occurred at that time, unless defendant
insurer can demonstrate that loss ac-
tually happened at time when risk was
borne by nonparty insurer under non-
contemporaneous policy.
Judgment entered against third party
defendant.
GREENE, Chief Judge
This case presents a rather uncom-
mon question of insurance law, and for
that reason it merits some discussion.
I
On November 2, 1962, prior to leav-
ing the United States, Finks placed a
bag of clothing in storage with Dean
Van Lines. He returned to this coun-
try in December 1964 and demanded
his clothes. Dean Van Lines was un-
able to locate the articles, and Finks
thereupon filed this action, claiming
$800. A verdict was rendered for Finks
in the amount of $325 on January 13,
1967.
This dispute is thus over. The pres-
ent dispute is between Dean Van Lines
(as third party plaintiff) and Fireman's
Fund Insurance Co. (third party de-
fendant), the insurer at the time the loss
was discovered. It appears that Fire-
man's Fund became Dean Van Lines'
insurer on October 1, 1964, and that
another company carried the same type
of insurance for the storage company
between November 1962 and Septem-
ber 30, 1964. The prior insurer is not a
party to this action, and it has not been
shown (and apparently is not now as-
certainable) whether the loss occurred
prior to or after October 1, 1964.
Fireman's Fund relies, at least in par-
tial defense, upon the prior insurance
and upon an "excess coverage" clause
in its insurance contract with Dean
Van Lines. That clause provides, in ef-
fect, that if other valid, collectible in-
surance exists, Fireman's liability shall
extend only to such losses as are in ex-
cess of the other policy's coverage.
Upon that basis, Fireman's Fund argues
that liability for the loss must be di-
vided between it and the company
which carried Dean Van Lines' insur-
ance prior to October 1964, and that
Fireman's Fund can be held liable here
only for its proportionate share of the
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loss. It is Fireman's theory that since
there was no trial finding as to the exact
time the loss occurred, it should be
assumed that both policies were in
effect at the time of the loss. Conse-
quently, it is argued, the loss should be
apportioned between the two insurers
on the basis of the amount of premi-
ums paid during the time each carried
coverage on the articles from the time
the clothing was placed in storage until
the time it was demanded and discov-
ered to be lost.
II
As a general proposition, any de-
fense to a prima facie case set out by
the insured must be proved fully by the
insurer (Anderson v. Connecticut Insur-
ance Co., 43 N.W. 2d 807, 813-814
(Minn., 1950)), who likewise carries the
burden of establishing facts which lim-
it its liability (Elizey v. Hardware Mu-
tual Ins. Co. of Minnesota, 40 So. 2d
24 (La., 1949)). More particularly, it is
incumbent upon an insurer who seeks
to apportion liability on the grounds of
other valid, collectible insurance, to
prove that such insurance exists (Kan-
sas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Baker, 313 S.W. 2d 846 (Ark., 1958)) as
well as the bounds, limitations, and ap-
plicability of such insurance to the
facts.
No such showing has been made
here. The prior insurer has not been
joined in the action. There has been
no precise demonstration of the type
of coverage the prior insurer issued to
Dean Van Lines. And there has been
no proof or attempted proof that the
other insurance is collectible by the in-
sured. Consequently there is no reason,
on the evidence, for limiting the liabil-
ity of Fireman's Fund.
III
But Fireman's Fund has suggested
that, if necessary, it should be per-
mitted to produce additional evidence
on this point, and in order to deter-
mine whether a reopening of the case
should be allowed, it becomes neces-
sary to determine whether such evidence
would make a difference.' In the
Court's view, even if Fireman's Fund
could show that the earlier coverage
was precisely the same as its own inso-
far as Finks' loss is concerned, it would
not change the result of this case, for
there is a more fundamental reason
than the evidentiary one for refusing to
limit Fireman's Fund's liability.
There is ample authority to support
the proposition of apportionment where
excess coverage clauses exist in two sep-
arate, contemporaneous policies cover-
ing the same type of loss. See, e.g., Ore-
gon Auto Ins. Co. v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 195 F. 2d 958
(C.A. 9, 1962); Insurance Co. of Texas
v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 163
F. Supp. 143, 69 A.L.R. 2d 1122, 1124,
1125 (S.D. Cal., 1958). What is not set-
tled, however, and what is involved in
this case, is the question whether ap-
portionment is appropriate where two
insurance policies cover the loss, each
being in force at a different period of
time, and it is not possible to deter-
mine when the loss occurred. In the
Court's view, that question must be
answered in the negative.
When two policies covering the same
risk are in force contemporaneously, it
is logical and appropriate to use an ex-
cess coverage clause as a vehicle for ap-
portioning liability. Each of the insurers
is liable for the loss and it would be
manifestly improper to impose the en-
tire burden upon only one of them. For
that reason, the law has recognized ap-
portionment in such cases.
But the same logic does not apply if
the two policies are not in effect at the
same time (i.e., the time of the loss).
When policies are in force in succes-
sion, either one insurer is liable, or the
1. It is worth noting in this connection that
when an insurer with an applicable excess coverage
clause pays the full amount of the loss, he acquires
a right of action against the other insurer for a
ratable proportion of the amount paid. See Ameri-
can Employers' Insurance Co. v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 218 F. 2d 335 (C.A. 4, 1954); compare Ameri-
can Reliable Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insu~ance Co., 110 N.W. 2d 344 (S.D. 1961).
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other, depending upon the date of the
loss. To divide liability between them
when the date of the loss cannot be
ascertained might seem Solomonic but
would still be improper, for it would
be unfair to one of the insurers, der
pending upon the time the loss actually
occurred. An apportionment in that sit-
uation would be an abdication of de-
cisional responsibility in favor of a
compromise solution having no roots in
logic. This the Court may not do. It
must make a choice.
But how is that choice to be made
when there is no evidence upon which
to predicate it? It seems to the Court
that in the absence of evidence the de-
cision must be made on the basis of pre-
sumption, that is, a rule of law de-
signed to operate in a void of evidence.
Generally, presumptions, whether cre-
ated by legislatures or by courts, operate
in favor of that result which is the most
likely in a particular situation on the
basis of human experience, the most
fair, or the most in line with public
policy. Those principles can be ap-
plied here.
The premium paid to the second in-
surer (here Fireman's Fund) would nor-
mally be based upon the presence on the
premises of all articles not by that time
discovered to have been lost or stolen
(in this case, including the clothing of
Finks). When a second insurer under-
takes to provide coverage, it naturally
assumes the risk of all losses concern-
ing these articles. To permit it to es-
cape from the obligation, either in
whole or in part, would be to grant it
an unjustified windfall. The prior in-
surer, by contrast, completes its period
of coverage without notice of any loss,
and it should not subsequently be
charged with such a loss, in the absence
of evidence that the loss actually oc-
curred during the period in question.
For these reasons, the Court will pre-
sume, in the absence of controlling pre-
cedent, that the loss occurred on the date
when it was first realized, and that the
insurer carrying the risk on that date is
liable, unless it can demonstrate on the
evidence that the loss actually happened
at an earlier period.
Since Fireman's Fund has been unable
to make this demonstration, judgment




D.C. Gen. Sess. Crim. No. 1434-67.
Jan. 30, 1968. Opinion Per Halleck, J.
Application for review of conditions of
release pursuant to the Bail Reform
Act. Held, where defendant presents
nothing new or of value in his applica-
tion, and where delay in seeking review
renders obsolete the little unverified in-
formation originally presented by the
D.C. Bail Agency, said conditions can-
not be altered.




D.C. Gen. Sess. Civil No. GS 9414-67.
Feb. 16, 1968. Opinion Per Korman, J.
Hearing pursuant to Gen. Sess. Civ. R.
56 upon cross-motions for summary
judgment in action on indemnification
agreement. Held, merely because each
party moves for summary judgment it
does not follow that there is no issue of
material fact, and where affidavits filed
by both parties pursant to Gen. Sess.
Civ. R. 56 (e) are insufficient to establish










Hearing on defendant's motion to strike
jury demand in action for pension pay-
ments allegedly due and to compel trus-
tees to continue payments. Held, said
motion may be made at any time prior
to or during trial, and even though
plaintiff in his pleadings declared at
law, he is seeking relief in equity and
therefore is not entitled to jury trial as
a matter of right.
Motion granted.
KORMAN, Judge
This matter is before the Court on
defendants' Motion to Strike Jury
Demand.
Defendants are the Trustees of the
Bakery and Sales Drivers' Local Union
No. 33 Industry Pension Fund, from
whom plaintiff seeks the amount al-
legedly due him under the pension
plan and to compel the Trustees to con-
tinue pension payments to him. Briefly,
plaintiff alleges that he had been a
dues-paying member of the Union dur-
ing the 29 years he had been employed as
a bakery salesman, that during a cer-
tain period of this time he was unem-
ployed because of medical disability,
that, upon reaching the age of 65 years,
he applied to the Fund for a pension,
that his application was denied, and
that the failure of the Board of Trus-
tees "to favorably determine eligibility
was arbitrary, capricious, contumacious
and in violation of the agreement."
In their answer, defendant-Trustees
deny that, in rejecting plaintiff's pen-
sion application, they acted unlawfully,
arbitrarily and contumaciously, that,
based upon the information submitted
by plaintiff and his employers and con-
tained in Union records, plaintiff did
not have sufficient past service credits
to qualify him for a pension under the
terms of the pension plan, and, in ef-
fect, that the medical evidence sub-
mitted by plaintiff in support of his
alleged total disability during the critical
period was not "satisfactory to the Trus-
tees", as provided in Section 2(a),
Article IV, of the pension plan.
In his opposition to Motion to Strike
Jury Demand, plaintiff questions the
timeliness of the motion.
No rule of this Court limits the time
within which a Motion to Strike Jury
Demand must be filed. Rule 39(a)
F.R.C.P. provides:
"When trial by jury has been de-
manded as provided in Rule 38, the
action shall be designated upon the
docket as a jury action. The trial
of all issues so demanded shall be
by jury, unless (1) the parties or
their attorneys of record, by writ-
ten stipulation filed with the court
or by an oral stipulation made in
open court and entered in the rec-
ord, consent to trial by the court
sitting without a jury or (2) the
court upon motion or of its own
initiative finds that a right of trial
by jury of some or all of those is-
sues does not exist under the Con-
stitution or statutes of the United
States." [Emphasis supplied.]
This Court has no comparable rule, but
its Rule 81 states:
"Unless otherwise herein pro-
vided, the trial and procedure in
cases involving equitable rights and
remedies shall be in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for the United States
District Courts to the extent that
such rules may be found to be
practicable." [Emphasis supplied.]
Rule 39 (a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure has been judicially con-
strued to mean that the motion to
strike jury demand may be made at any
time prior to trial or during trial. In
Fraser v. Geist (D. C. Pa. 1940), 1
F.R.D. 267, the issue was whether plain-
tiff was entitled to a jury trial as a
matter of right. Holding that the only
relief available to the plaintiff was
equitable in nature, the Court, after
quoting Rule 39 (a) and (c)1, F.R.C.P.,
stated:
1. Rule 39 (c) F.R.C.P. provides In pertinent
part: "In all actions not triable of right by a jury
the court upon motion or its own initiative may try
any issue with an advisory jury 0 , ."
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"It is thus apparent that Rule
39 makes it incumbent upon the
court to decide from the pleadings
and prior to trial whether or not
the action is one at law or in
equity." [Emphasis supplied.]
In the case of Simmons v. Avisco,
Local 713, Textile Workers Union of
America, 350 F.2d 1012, 1017 (4th Cir.
1965), an action brought under the
Landrum-Griffin Act for restoration to
union membership and for damages re-
sulting from suspension, the Court
stated:
"We sustain the District Court's
ruling that the objection to jury
trial came too late, for the point
was not raised either by pre-trial
motion or in the course of the
trial, but later in a motion for
judgment n.o.v. or new trial."
It thus appears that the motion to
strike jury demand may be made at
any time prior to trial and even dur-
ing trial. Here the motion was made
prior to trial and pursuant to leave
granted by the pre-trial judge. There-
fore, on the basis of the authorities
cited, the motion was timely filed.
The right to a jury trial in civil cases
is guaranteed by the Seventh Amend-
ment to the Constitution, which pro-
vides:
"In Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall ex-
ceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any Court
of the United States, than accord-
ing to the rules of the common
law."
Because the Amendment does not
specify the actions and issues as to which
the right to jury trial exists, to find
the meaning of the language resort
has always been had to the common
law in effect when the Amendment was
adopted in 1791. As a result, there
evolved the general principle that the
Amendment intended to guarantee the
right of jury trial in cases in which
there was such entitlement at common
law, but not to create a right in cases
wherein a jury trial was not demand-
able as of right in 1791.2
Accordingly, since there were at com-
mon law no jury trials in equity mat-
ters, no right to trial by jury exists
where the claim is one for equitable
relief. The determinative factor, then,
is whether the case at bar is an action
at law or one of an equitable nature.
Plaintiff, claiming that he has met the
eligibility requirements and is a quali-
fied beneficiary under the provisions of
a retirement fund, is suing the Trustees
of the fund for payments therefrom.
Section 197 of Restatement of Trusts
2d reads as follows:
"Except as stated in Sec. 198,
the remedies of the beneficiary
against the trustee are exclusively
equitable."
Section 198, referred to in the quota-
tion, reads in part as follows:
"(1) If the trustee is under a
duty to pay money immediately
and unconditionally to the bene-
ficiary, the beneficiary can main-
tain an action at law against the
trustee to enforce payment."
Elaborating thereon, the Municipal
Court of the City of New York said in
Hoffman v. Nagler (1954)3:
"This duty to pay money immedi-
ately is in the nature of an obliga-
tion creating a debt or of an
engagement, the nonperformance of
which may be the subject of dam-
ages at law.
"There is an obvious distinction
between a trust and a debt. A
fiduciary relation exists between a
trustee and a beneficiary while no
fiduciary relation exists between a
debtor and creditor as such."
Because of the limited jurisdiction of
the Municipal Court of the City of
2. 2B, Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice
and Procedure, Sec. 872.
3. 206 Misc. 623, 134 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338-339.
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New York, Hoffman, an action by a
union member against retirement fund
trustees for retirement benefits allegedly
due because of contributions to the
fund by the plaintiff's employer, turned
on the nature of the action as one at
law or in equity. As in the case at bar,
plaintiff therein sought a money judg-
ment representing unpaid retirement
benefits and contended that the suit
was, therefore, one at law. Defendants
there similarly argued that the nature
of the action was equitable. Agreeing
with the defendants, the Court stated:
"The question is whether the
complaint sufficiently states the
ascertainment of some definite and
clear legal debt, or the equivalent
thereof. In the opinion of the court
exercising the utmost liberality, the
complaint cannot be interpreted as
setting forth a definite and clear
legal debt or its equivalent.
"Notwithstanding the nature of
the formal demand of the plain-
tiff for a money judgment, the
character of the action is equitable
in nature and this court does not
have jurisdiction." [Emphasis sup-
plied.]
A leading case dealing with the prop-
osition is Barlow v. Roche, Lewis and
Schmidt, Trustees, and United Mine
Workers of America (D. C. Mun. App.
1960), 161 A.2d 58. It involved a claim
against the Union and the trustees for
hospital and medical care benefits un-
der a trust fund established pursuant to
a collective bargaining agreement. Plain-
tiff claimed that the Union was neg-
ligent in not providing a form on
which to make claim and that the trus-
tees wrongfully refused payments be-
cause of his failure to present the form.
Particularly relevant to the issue at
bar was the question of reasonableness
of the trustees' action in rejecting the
claim. In affirming the trial court's find-
ing that the trustees did not act un-
reasonably, the Court of Appeals stated
the general principles concerning ac-
tions against trustees of retirement and
pension funds:
" * 0 [C]ourts will, when a trus-
tee is attacked, call for evidence of
conduct which is tainted by fraud,
or is malicious in its nature, or is
perpetrated in bad faith, or which
is so arbitrary and cavalier in its
manner that it is an abuse of the
authority purportedly exercised.
"Appellant's complaint against
the Trust stated an action at law
for monies due and owing. He
said that * * he was entitled to
benefits from the Trust** *be-
cause of the contractual obligations
of the trustees** *. The Trust
denied the allegations and de-
manded proof. Appellant did not
ask for equitable relief. Neverthe-
less, the case was tried as a suit in
equity.
"The first question presented is
whether the court erred in grant-
ing the Trust's motion to strike ap-
pellant's demand for a jury trial.
"Appellant argues that the na-
ture of the right he asserts is con-
tractual; that he is a third-party
beneficiary of the Coal Wage Agree-
ment; that the trustees are under
contractual obligation, and that the
right asserted against them is one
at law sounding in contract. There
is authority for this position [cit-
ting] * ** but we do not agree.
First, it may well be that appellant
is a third-party beneficiary of the
Coal Wage Agreement * * *. [E]ven
though the words of creation are
found in a labor agreement, to
which appellant may be a third-
party beneficiary, they remain as
the words of the Trust's creation
and appellant is, so far as the Trust
is concerned, one for whom its
benefits were intended. Accord-
ingly, we feel that the nature of his
position is one in equity rather
than at law.
"Appellant next suggests that
even if he holds an equitable po-
sition in relation to the Trust, his
recovery, in this suit, is at law.
Certainly the mere fact that a suit
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is against a trust does not preclude
a jury trial. Moreover, if the pray-
er is for damages, then usually
there is a right to a jury trial.
However, in suing a trustee at law,
the right of the beneficiary should
be predicated upon the trustee's
immediate and unconditional duty
to pay the beneficiary. Such is not
the case here. We will, therefore,
look beyond the pleadings to the
basic nature of the suit and to the
central point of contention. That
concerns not a dispute as to whether
the money is due and owing, or the
amount, but rather the reasonable-
ness of the trustees in refusing pay-
ment. Thus, although appellant de-
clares in law, he seeks, basically,
equity, and the motion [to strike jury
demand] was correctly granted."
[Emphasis supplied.]
See to the same effect Gambrell v.
Lewis (D. C. Mun. App. 1961), 167 A.2d
605, 606; Sichko v. Lewis (D. C. Pa.
1960), 191 F. Supp. 68; Kennet v.
United Mine Workers of America
(D.C.D.C. 1960, Judge Holtzoff), 183 F.
Supp. 315, 317; Ruth v. Lewis (D.C.D.C.
1958, Judge Youngdahl), 166 F. Supp.
346, 349.
The case before the Court is, basical-
ly, one to establish plaintiff's status and
rights as a beneficiary. He alleges that
he has met all of the requirements of
eligibility to receive the pension bene-
fits and that the trustees acted arbi-
trarily and capriciously in refusing to
pay him his pension. Defendants, on
the other hand, allege that, on the rec-
ord presented to them, plaintiff did not
meet the eligibility requirements and
deny that they acted arbitrarily or
capriciously. To resolve this basic ques-
tion a judicial determination is sought.
Solely involved is the reasonableness of
the trustees' action. If that issue is re-
solved favorably to the plaintiff, the
matter of benefit payments and the
amount of such payments, if any, will
be automatically governed by the pro-
visions of the trust agreement.
Upon the overwhelming weight of
authority on this subject and the law as
enunciated by the courts in this and
other jurisdictions, it is the opinion of
the Court that the basic nature of the
case at bar is equitable and that the
central point of the controversy con-
cerns, not whether money is due and
owing, but, rather, the reasonableness
of the trustees' action in refusing pay-
ment. Even though the plaintiff in his
pleadings declares in law, he is seeking
relief in equity. He is, therefore, not
entitled to a jury trial as a matter of
right and defendants' Motion to Strike
Jury Demand should and will be
granted.





D.C. Gen. Sess. Civil No. GS 18450-65.
Feb. 27, 1968.
Hearing pursuant to Gen. Sess. Civ. R.
55 (b) (2) to establish truth of plaintiff's
averments by evidence prior to enter-
ing default judgment. Held, where de-
fendant has answered, the court is
without power to enter judgment by de-
fault on the pleadings, and that plain-
tiff's answers to self-directed interroga-
tories provided little, if anything, more
than that set forth in the complaint.
Judgment denied without prejudice.
KORMAN, Judge
By way of verified complaint, plain-
tiff sued the defendant for a liquidated
sum of $532.95, representing the bal-
ance allegedly due and owing for
services rendered. Upon being served,
defendant answered denying the claim.
The matter was set for trial, but be-
cause of some neglect of defendant
(perhaps failure to appear) not dis-
cernible from the record, a default was
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entered and, pursuant to Rule 55 (b) of
the Court, the case was set on the Mo-
tions Calendar for ex parte proof.
At the hearing, plaintiff's attorney
proffered proof of its case by way of
notarized answers to written interroga-
tories served on his client by himself.
While not asking for a default judg-
ment, plaintiff asks the Court to base a
trial finding upon such self-serving an-
swers to his own written interrogatories.
The interrogatories purport to be is-
sued under Rule 33, but that Rule,
which does not appear to have been
complied with in other respects, pro-
vides only for the service of interroga-
tories upon "any adverse party."
To permit such procedure would
deny to the Court the exercise of some
of its supervisory and fact-finding func-
tions in connection with the entry of
judgments. Rule 55 (b) empowers the
Court to conduct a hearing or to order
any other necessary investigation to de-
termine either the amount of damages
or the truth and veracity of witness'
testimony or of any issue. Moreover, the
Rule provides for a three-day notice to
the defendant of the hearing, which af-
fords to the latter an opportunity to be
present for cross-examination of the
witnesses offered.
The question before the Court is
whether to accept as proof the answers
to self-directed interrogatories or to re-
quire the presence of the plaintiff or its
witnesses for oral testimony. Klein v.
Rappaport (D. C. Mun. App. 1952), 90
A.2d 834, stands for the proposition
that, once the defendant has answered,
the Court is without power to enter
judgment by default on the pleadings,
but must take testimony, assess dam-
ages, and enter a trial finding. The writ-
ten answers to the interrogatories pro-
vide little, if anything, more than that
set forth in the verified complaint.
The procedure plaintiff would have
the Court accept denies to the defend-
ant the opportunity of confrontation
and denies to the Court the power of
investigation which the Rule provides.





CREECH and Fidelity and Casualty
Co. of New York
D.C. Gen. Sess. Civil No. GS 18249-67.
Feb. 29, 1968. Opinion Per Fickling, J.
Director of Property Division of Met-
ropolitan Police Department impleaded
automobile owner's theft insurer and
party who innocently and for value
purchased automobile from or through
thief to determine which has superior
title. Held, automobile owner's theft in-
surer has superior title to stolen auto-
mobile over innocent purchaser for
value who purchases from or through
thief.
Order accordingly.
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